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Abstract
Over the past five years the U.S. domestic crude benchmark, WTI, diverged considerably from
its foreign counterpart, Brent. Some studies pointed to the crude oil export ban as the main
culprit for this divergence, but pipeline capacity was also scarce during this time. To understand
the drivers of domestic crude oil discounts, we decompose domestic price differentials for multiple
crudes into the contributions of shipping and export constraints. We find that scarce pipeline
capacity explains the majority of the deviation of mid-continent crude oil prices from their long-
run relationship with Brent crude, while refining changes explain very little. This implies that
the deleterious effects of the export ban may have been exaggerated.
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1 Introduction
In 1975, United States President Gerald Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA), which prohibited the export of domestically produced crude oil and created the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve. Signed shortly after the OPEC oil embargo of 1973–74 and during a time when
many feared the arrival of “peak oil,” the ban was designed to keep domestic crude in the U.S.
and enhance domestic energy security. For many years, the crude export ban—hereafter referred
to as the “export ban” or more simply “the ban”—had little bite: declining domestic crude oil
production and increasing domestic demand meant that the U.S. imported ever more crude oil.
In the late 2000s and after many years of declining U.S. crude oil production, the combination
of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques enabled companies to produce oil and gas
from geological formations that had been, heretofore, uneconomic. This technological innovation
sparked a renaissance in U.S. crude oil production, which began rising quickly. By the end of 2014,
U.S. production had reached levels not seen since the 1970s.
As U.S. crude oil production rose, price differentials between domestic and international crudes
grew to unprecedented levels. At its peak, the most widely cited U.S. crude benchmark, West Texas
Intermediate (WTI), was trading at more than a $25 discount to the international benchmark, Brent
crude. This was unheard-of: WTI had consistently traded at a slight premium to Brent for decades.
The large differential spurred a robust debate over what was causing domestic crudes to sell at such
a steep discount to their foreign counterparts and whether the unusual discount could be eliminated
by removing the export ban.
In December 2015, the export ban was lifted as part of an omnibus spending bill. While the
policy change was controversial, those for and those against lifting the ban tended to associate it
with the domestic crude discount. Those against lifting the ban argued that allowing crude exports
would cause increases in domestic refined product prices, like gasoline, and they argued that ex-
porting crude would reduce the the security of the nation’s energy supply. Proponents of lifting the
ban refuted these concerns. First, they argued that exporting crude oil would not increase gasoline
prices; if anything it would lead to a decrease in gasoline prices as oil prices dropped with expanded
supply and depressed refined product prices (Yergin et al., 2014; Ebinger and Greenley, 2014; Med-
lock, 2015). Second, they argued that increasing domestic prices to parity with international ones
would spur new investment and oil production, creating hundreds of thousands of domestic jobs
(Yergin et al., 2014; Ebinger and Greenley, 2014).
Our analysis suggests that it was not the export ban which was the culprit for these price differ-
entials. Instead we present evidence that internal transportation constraints within the U.S. explain
half to three-fourths of price differentials, while refining and international exporting constraints can
explain just a few percent.
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Figure 1: WTI and LLS premia over Brent
Two competing explanations Two widely cited studies in support of lifting the export ban
(Yergin et al., 2014; Ebinger and Greenley, 2014) argued that the ban contributed significantly
to this price differential. Their explanation for this phenomenon can be summarized as follows.
Refineries in the U.S. are able to purchase both foreign and domestic crude, as there is no ban on
the import of crude oil, only its export. Because domestic and foreign crudes are substitutes in
production, the two generally trade at similar prices. Any difference has historically been associated
with quality differentials, transportation costs, or transitory shocks. After decades of declining
domestic crude oil production, domestic refineries had gradually reconfigured themselves to process
cheaper imported crudes that were more viscous and had higher sulfur content, i.e. heavy, sour
grades (EIA, 2015). Oils from unconventional sources (termed light-tight oils, or LTOs, in industry)
have a different chemical composition: they are less viscous and have lower sulfur content (lighter
and sweeter) than foreign crudes, and domestic refineries were not optimized to handle the large
quantities of LTOs that shales were producing. Because of this mismatch, marginal refiners were
only able to profitably process LTOs if they could purchase them at a discount. Even though
lighter crudes, like those from shale, were trading at a premium to heavier ones in the international
market, the export ban eliminated foreign sources of demand: selling to domestic refineries was
the only option. Thus, crude from shales displaced imports, and domestic refineries sold their own
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excess production internationally.1 These studies conclude that lifting the ban would have allowed
for domestic producers to sell crude in the international market at a higher price instead of selling
to domestic refineries at a lower price.
An alternative explanation, and the one we argue was more important, has to do with shipping
constraints within the U.S.—not the prohibition on exporting the crude outside of the country. This
theory points to the fact that in addition to unusual discounts between domestic and international
crudes, the shale boom coincided with unusual price differentials within the U.S. In the short run,
unprecedented new volumes of crude overwhelmed existing pipeline capacity between locations like
North Dakota’s Bakken formation in the mid-continent and refineries located in the Gulf Coast
region. Cushing, Oklahoma, the pricing point for the domestic crude oil benchmark, WTI, is
in the mid-continent. Cushing oil inventories grew and producers resorted to alternative, more
costly, transportation options: railroad and barges. These marginal transportation options only
made economic sense when the price in the mid-continent was discounted to the price at the
Gulf Coast. This theory suggests that it is these transportation constraints within the U.S. that
created the price differentials between Brent and WTI, and several studies have associated internal
shipping constraints with such internal price differentials (Borenstein and Kellogg, 2014; Kaminski,
2014; Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al., 2013; Fattouh, 2007, 2010, 2009). In fact, McRae (2015) argues that
transportation constraints were exacerbated by vertically integrated ConocoPhillips for the purpose
of improving refinery profits.
Empirical approach The degree to which this discount was due to a constraint on external
trade (the ban) or internal trade (pipeline congestion) is an empirical question. If the constraint
was internal, then the opportunity to arbitrage spatial differences in price would have led to new
pipeline construction and the elimination of the discount without any new legislation. However,
if the discount was due to a mis-match of refining capacity with new U.S. crude supplies, then
an earlier lifting of the export ban might have raised domestic wellhead prices for oil producers,
increasing their profitability and mitigating the extent to which domestic refineries had to make
operational changes to handle this new source of crude. A number of papers have examined on
the Brent–WTI price differential, taking a more financial perspective (Fattouh, 2007, 2009, 2010;
Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al., 2013; Kao and Wan, 2012); however, ours is the first paper to investigate
which physical constraints have been driving this differential and the policy implications of these
constraints.
We begin our analysis by discussing the interactions between oil production, transport, and
demand in refining and the export-market: the upstream, midstream, and downstream market seg-
ments. We present descriptive evidence that increased shale production led to significant disruption
in the midstream sector. The evidence is consistent with the presence—and subsequent relief—of
1Initially, the EPCA banned the export of both crude oil and refined products, but the ban on refined products
was lifted under President Regan.
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transportation constraints. We use econometric analysis to compare the difference between the
price of Brent crude oil (subject to no U.S. constraints) and prices of mid-continent crudes (subject
to both pipeline constraints and the ban) with the difference between Brent and coastal crudes
(subject only to the ban). Using our estimates, we test for structural breaks in price differentials at
discrete points coincident with when the internal and external constraints change. We find that the
largest breaks happen for crudes subject to internal constraints (mid-continent crudes), not Gulf
Coast crudes subject only to external constraints. Then, we regress price differentials on measures
of transportation and refining constraints. We find that transportation constraints have an order of
magnitude more explanatory power than refining constraints. Taken together, our results strongly
suggest that the export ban was not the main cause of large domestic crude discounts. Instead,
the majority of the price differential between WTI and Brent can be explained by internal shipping
constraints within the U.S., not the export ban.
2 Oil price differentials and arbitrage
The Law of One Price—hereafter referred to as “LOOP”—means that two crude oils should trade
at the same price, , conditional on quality differences (including location). Should one price depart
from another, an opportunity for arbitrage exists, and competitive firms can make risk-free profits
by buying low and selling high as long as the difference in prices is larger than marginal trading
costs. Trading costs could be transportation costs or the opportunity cost of substituting one good
for another, and long run price differences reflect these costs. Competition and free entry will
ensure that profits—and excess price differences—are competed away.
Deviations from long-run pricing can arise because of frictions that prevent immediate adjust-
ment to shocks. The most extreme example of such an adjustment friction is a binding constraint
that rules out a certain type of arbitrage. In the U.S. market for crude oil, we should expect that
producers and refiners will actively arbitrage away any disequilibrium price differences. The two
sets of price differences we consider are the difference between mid-continent crudes (like WTI)
and the international Brent crude benchmark, and the difference between crude prices on the U.S.
Gulf Coast, such as Louisiana Light Sweet (LLS), and Brent crude. The former differential is likely
to be affected by both pipeline and export constraints, but the latter, only refinery and/or export
constraints. We discuss both of the economic actors’ arbitrage possibilities, and the descriptive
analysis in this section will serve as the basis for our empirical tests.
2.1 Refining and export restrictions
Refineries transform crude oil inputs into petroleum product outputs such as gasoline, diesel fuel,
and lubricants. From the 1975 until December 2015, exports of crude oil—refineries’ main input—
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were illegal.2 However, once the crude was refined into petroleum products, these could be sold on
the world market with no restrictions. Harold Hamm, CEO of Continental Resources—an upstream
oil and gas producer—summarizes this phenomenon, saying:
Major oil companies are exporting refined products with no limitations. Why shouldn’t
independent producers be allowed to do the same?. . . This would be equivalent to telling
American farmers they can’t export their wheat, yet allowing Pillsbury to export all the
processed flour they want.
Global petroleum product prices track international crude oil prices closely because oil is the
primary input in the production process. This meant domestic refiners were in prime position to
arbitrage differences between increasing supplies of discounted domestic crude and undiscounted
international petroleum product prices. Because crude oil is an intermediate good; it is generally
not useful without refining. Thus, before the export ban was lifted, domestic refineries were the
only major source of demand for domestic U.S. crude oil.3
Refineries are highly optimized to maximize the profit from transforming hydrocarbon feedstocks
into petroleum produts. Since crude oils are heterogeneous in their chemical compositions, part
of this optimization involves tuning refineries to a particular diet of crude oil. Historically, the
U.S. has produced “light sweet” crude that has a relatively low density (“light”) and relatively low
sulfur content (“sweet”). U.S. refineries were originally built to process this domestically produced
light sweet crude. However, since domestic oil production started to decline in the 1970s while
demand for refinery outputs continued, refineries have substituted towards cheaper “heavy-sour”
crude imported from overseas that technologically advanced U.S. plants could handle. This has
resulted in a shift towards a heavier slate of crude oil inputs to refineries.
Refineries can adjust to this new supply of light sweet crude in several ways. First, as prices
of products and particular crude oils change, refiners can, to some extent, modify the mix of
crudes while maintaining key aspects crude slate’s overall chemical composition.4 For instance, if
light crude is relatively inexpensive, a refinery might purchase more light crude and more heavy
crude, causing the refinery to substitute away from a medium grade crude to take advantage of the
relatively inexpensive light crude. This mixing gives the refinery flexibility to change its purchases
to adapt to changing relative availability and prices. Second, refineries can adjust to new domestic
crude supplies by offsetting imports of light sweet crudes from other parts of the world. In fact, light
2A few exceptions allowed limited exports to specific refineries in countries like Canada and Mexico, for instance,
as well as from the Alaskan North Slope.
3It should be noted, that while not associated with oil specifically, similar export restrictions on raw materials but
not final products have been studied. For instance, certain types of logs have similar export restrictions (Fooks et al.,
2013) while the wood products produced from these logs are traded freely. On one hand, these restrictions are meant
to encourage investment in the domestic processing industry and therefore support domestic employment (Dudley,
2004). On the other, these restrictions have been found to lower log prices and therefore reduce the incentive to
harvest (von Amsberg, 1998). Similar export restrictions have also been observed in developing nations for products
such as fish, wildlife and raw grains (Bale and Lutz, 1981; Anderson, 2009).
4EIA (2015) discusses the technical options for refining additional LTOs in light of the recent shale oil boom.
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sweet crude oil imports have declined significantly, while heavy sour imports have actually slightly
increased over the past decade.5 Finally, refiners can make physical plant additions and alterations
to allow for a different mix of crude to be processed, though these capital expenditures are expensive.
While refiners are unlikely to make significant changes to their equipment and operations in response
to a transitory shock, they are able to make significant changes to accommodate structural changes
in crude availability. This means that different grades of crude oil are imperfect substitutes in the
short run, but significant substitutions are possible in the longer run.6
When domestic crude oil prices are discounted to international crude prices, refiners have an
indirect arbitrage opportunity. Because refined product prices typically follow international crude
prices, domestic refineries can purchase discounted domestic crude while selling refined products on
the higher priced global market. However, this requires refiners to substitute higher-priced foreign
crudes for low-priced domestic ones in their operations. Such substitution may be as simple as
changing the mix of crude inputs into the refinery by replacing heavier crudes with medium grades
to mix with the domestic light crude. At the same time, such substitutions might cause the refinery
to underutilize some of the specialized capital equipment designed to handle its previous crude oil
diet. The change in diets may also require making changes to the refinery itself (EIA, 2015).7
The top two panes of Figure 2 show that as domestic oil production increased, both U.S.
production and exports of petroleum products increased dramatically. Simultaneously, the average
API gravity of refiners’ crude inputs (the inverse of crude oil density) increased sharply. This
suggests that refiners either refiners substituted away from their traditional diets to ones that
included higher concentrations of light oils, or that there was an increased utilization of simple
refineries that were already configured to handle these light oils, or that both of these things
happend.
The panels in Figure 2 show three things. First, the shift in mid-continent crude oil production
was mirrored by the average API gravity of crude oils input into Gulf Coast refineries. Second,
exports of refined products increased significantly over this time period. Third, crude oil exports
did increase, as a few exceptions to the ban allowed limited exports to specific refineries in Canada
and Mexico, for instance. Nevertheless, the growth of refined products exports in terms of volumes
far exceeded this growth in crude exports. These three facts suggest that domestic refineries were
able to successfully process increased volumes of LTOs, although plausibly at a lower operation
efficiency or with significant capital expenditures. It does not appear to be the case that refiners
were simply not able to process more crude. Depending on refiners’ marginal rates of technical
5Compute import volumes by API using EIA data available at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_ipct_
k_m.htm and https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUS1&f=M.
6According to Eric Smith, Associate Director of the Tulane Energy Institute, this overall market transition towards
processing more-or-less all light crude could take as long as 20 years and would be associated with significant capital
expenses and stranded assets.
7Some firms have also built “mini-refineries” that process the crude just enough to get around the export restriction
(Nussbaum and Olson, 2014). The output is sold as a petroleum product on the world market.
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Figure 2: Refining, exports, and production
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substitution between grades of crude, they may have required a price discount on LTOs to increase
their share in the crude input mix, just as a discount would be required for more expensive modes of
crude oil transport to be used. Thus, the relative share of refinery constraints on the the WTI-Brent
discount is an empirical question and is addressed in this research.
2.2 Producers and transportation constraints
U.S. oil production, transport, and refining is reported regionally by Petroleum Administration
Defense Districts (PADDs). Much of the oil production and refining demand takes place in PADDs
2, 3, and 4, which are the Midwest, Gulf Coast, and Rocky Mountains, respectively. One of the
biggest sources of new shale oil, North Dakota, is in PADD 2. PADD 2 also contains Cushing,
Oklahoma, where WTI is traded and priced. Much of the nation’s refining lies in PADD 3 along
the Gulf Coast. Figure 3 shows the prices of WTI and Louisiana Light Sweet (LLS), a Gulf
Coast crude from PADD 3. For over a decade, the two traded in close proximity to each other.
However, beginning in the late 2000s, a large price gap was created. With sufficient transportation
infrastructure, a profit-maximizing producer or buyer of crude oil in the mid-continent would see
an arbitrage opportunity, transport its oil to the Gulf Coast, and sell it there. Such a price
difference could only be sustained in presence of infrastructure constraints or high transportation
costs equal to the price differences. Some in the industry have interpreted the WTI–LLS differential
as representative of the value of transportation constraints between the mid-continent and Gulf
Coast refining.8
Most transportation of crude oil has, historically, been via pipeline. This is because transporting
crude oil via pipeline costs far less, on the margin, than via the alternatives, usually rail and barge.
Pipelines, however, require large, fixed capital investments and a long time to construct, unlike rail
and barge which require less up-front investment and posess greater destination flexibility. If there
is excess demand for pipeline capacity, we should see temporary increases in the the use of with high
marginal cost rail and barge. Should firms also expect demand for transportation to exceed current
pipeline capacity for the foreseeable future, pipeline builders will respond to profitable investment
opportunities and build new capacity. The increased supply of low-cost transportation will lead
to subsequent decreases in the share of non-pipeline transport, and marginal transportation costs
will also be lower. During the interim period, however, high marginal cost of transportation should
induce significant price differentials between supply and demand locations.
Figure 4 relates the share of pipeline, rail, and tanker in transporting crude from the mid-
continent (PADDs 2 and 4) to the Gulf Coast (PADD 3) with the WTI–LLS price differential. The
dashed line at January 2007 represents the start of the boom in LTO production.9 The line at May
8Thanks to Anna Temple, an analyst at market intelligence firm Wood Mackenzie, for pointing this out. See
also, for example, Fielden (2013) and Investor’s Business Daily (2014). In the preliminary part of their analysis,
Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al. (2013) also interpret the WTI–LLS differential in this way.
9Section 4.2 discusses how we date the start of the boom in LTO production from shale.
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2012 marks the opening of the Seaway pipeline that started relieving transportation bottlenecks,10
and the line at January 2016 marks the lifting of the export ban. Visual inspection of the figure
suggests that this intra-U.S. difference in crude oil prices is highly correlated with transportation
modes.
The top panel of Figure 5 shows oil production in the mid-continent (PADDs 2 and 4). As
oil production in these areas continued down a long-run decline curve, existing pipeline capacity
was sufficient to meet transportation needs. The advent of LTO production from shale, however,
increased oil production in the mid-continent from a total of approximately 300 million barrels in
2006, to more than 955 million in 2015 (EIA, 2016). Demand for transportation from the mid-
continent to refineries on the Gulf Coast far outstripped pipeline capacity, and producers had to
use other, more expensive, modes of transportation: rail and barge. Figure 5 shows transportation
by mode from the mid-continent to the Gulf Coast. Before 2007, crude movements by tanker and
rail are essentially zero; however, this quickly rises with production.
Producers’ willingness to pay high marginal transportation costs was a signal to pipeline firms
10We discuss the May 2012 break later in this section.
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to invest in new infrastructure. The most notable such investment was the reversal of the Seaway
Pipeline that runs from Freeport, TX to Cushing, Oklahoma, where WTI is priced. The pipeline
came online in 1976 with the purpose of transporting foreign crude imported to the Gulf Coast to
the refineries in the Midwest. During the peak of the crude price differentials, the Seaway pipeline
was jointly owned by ConocoPhillips and Enterprise Products Partners, LP. ConocoPhilips is a
vertically integrated company owning significant refining capacity, while Enterprise Partners is a
mid-stream pipeline company. McRae (2015) argues that vertically integrated ConocoPhilips made
the explicit decision not to reverse the pipeline for the purposes of sustaining this price differential
to boost profits of its down-stream refining operations. McRae (2015) estimates that the delay of
the Seaway Pipeline reversal cost the ConocoPhillips approximately $200,000 per day in profits,
yet it gained approximately $2 million per day in higher profits on its Midwest refining operations.
In November of 2011, ConocoPhilips announced the sale of its share in the pipeline, and in May
of 2012 the Seaway Pipeline reversed direction, relieving the transportation bottleneck. Around the
time of this reversal, the share of crude being shipped to the Gulf Coast via tanker and rail peaked
at around 60 percent. However, even after the reversal was completed, producers required yet more
pipeline capacity to move the glut of LTOs coming from the mid-continent to the Gulf Coast, so in
January of 2013, the pipeline’s capacity was upgraded from its initial capacity of 150,000 barrels
per day (BPD) to approximately 400,000 BPD.
While the Seaway Pipeline received a great deal of attention, it was by no means the only
pipeline reversal or expansion that occurred in response to the shale boom. For instance, the
Longhorn Pipeline reversal in 2013 allowed for crude to get from West Texas’ Permian basin to
Houston for refining. Another example is the Houma-to-Houston pipeline reversal in late 2013 and
early 2014. Even at the time of this writing, the Bayou Bridge pipeline from Nederland, Texas
to St. James, Louisiana is in the permitting process for moving crude to refineries in southeast
Louisiana. As shown in Figure 5, by the time the export ban was lifted in December of 2015, only
a small volume of crude (around 12 percent) was being moved to the Gulf Coast by tanker and
rail, while the rest moved through the newly upgraded pipeline system, down from 60% in April
2012 during the peak of the shale boom.
2.3 Hypotheses
We have discussed two plausible causes for crude price differentials: transportation bottlenecks
within the U.S. and the export ban that prevented producers from selling crude outside of the
U.S. If transportation constraints existed during the recent shale boom, we expect to see mid-
continent crudes (WTI and WTS) discounted relative to Gulf Coast crudes (LLS, HLS, and FO
USGC). Conditional on the chemical composition of crudes, refining constraints should affect both
mid-continent and coastal crudes equally.
We have three empirical hypotheses. First, the Law of One Price implies that prices of mid-
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continent crudes, Gulf Coast crudes, and foreign crude should track each other very closely over
long time periods. Any differences in prices in the long run should be associated with transportation
costs and quality differences. Second, during the shale boom, domestic prices should have decreased
relative to the international benchmark, Brent. If internal shipping constraints within the U.S.
were the primary culprit for these differentials, then we would expect to see mid-continent crudes
sell at a significantly steeper discount than the Gulf Coast crudes that were already located near
domestic refineries. However, if the export ban was the primary culprit for these differentials, then
we would expect for both mid-continent and Gulf Coast crudes to sell at similar discounts. The
contribution of each to the price differentials we have seen is, therefore, an empirical question.
Third, if transportation was the primary constraint, price differentials between mid-continent and
foreign crudes should converge as pipeline reversals and upgrades were completed. Alternatively, if
the export ban was the primary constraint, we would expect for price differentials to continue despite
these reversals until the lifting of the export ban. The extent of convergence post transportation
constraints being lifted can provide insight into the relative importance of these two constraints.
3 Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
3.1 Crude Oil Data
We utilize time series data from 1990 through the end of 2015 for purposes of this analysis. For
all empirical specifications, the outcome variable of interest is the difference in the spot price of
a domestic U.S. crude and the international Brent crude benchmark. Section 4 explains how we
compute price differentials.
We use two data sources for our crude oil prices. First, we consider consider five spot prices
from Bloomberg.11 These daily prices are associated with major crude trading hub on five daily
spot prices, and we average them to the monthly level. The first three are mid-continent crudes:
West Texas Intermediate (WTI),12 priced for delivery at Cushing, Oklahoma; WTI Midland,13
priced at Midland, Texas where the Permian Basin is located; and West Texas Sour (WTS)14. The
last two are coastal crudes: Louisiana Light Sweet Crude (LLS), priced at St. James, Louisiana15;
and Heavy Louisiana Sweet Crude (HLS), priced at Empire, Louisiana.16
Second, we consider estimated wellhead crude oil prices as compiled by the U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration (EIA). Unlike the Bloomberg prices that are trading prices at specific
11According to Bloomberg, “Bloomberg’s spot crude oil price indications use benchmark WTI crude at Cushing,
Oklahoma and other U.S. crude grade prices are derived by adding spot market spreads to WTI also priced at
Midland.”
12API gravity: 39 deg; sulfur content: 0.34%
13API gravity: 39 deg; sulfur content: 0.34%
14API gravity: 34 deg; sulfur content: 1.9%.
15API gravity: 35.7 deg; sulfur content: 0.44%.
16API gravity: 33.7 deg; sulfur content: 0.39%.
14
-40
-20
0
20
-40
-20
0
20
90 95 00 05 10 15 90 95 00 05 10 15 90 95 00 05 10 15
WTI Cushing WTI Midland WTS
LLS HLS FO USGC
Lines at Jan 2007, May 2012, Jan 2016
Figure 6: Midcontinent (top) and coastal (bottom) premiums to Brent
15
hub, these are EIA’s estimates of the average price that producers receive at the wellhead across
different geographic locations based on data reported by producers. In our main results, we use
EIA as the source of the price for Federal Offshore Gulf of Mexico (FO USGC) production. In
Appendix A.2, we also consider all other geography-specific wellhead prices provided by EIA (there
are more than 30). We run an identical analysis on these series as a robustness check and find no
qualitative difference in our results.
The six price differentials we analyze are plotted in Figure 6. The top three are inland crudes
and must to be transported to a refinery (often the Gulf Coast, where more than half of the nation’s
refining capacity is located) after they exit the wellhead or, in the absence of the export ban, a port
where they can be shipped overseas. All six crudes would be affected by both pipeline constraints
and the export ban. Turning to the bottom three plots, LLS and HLS are produced primarily in the
marshes of southern Louisiana and are priced for delivery nearby in the same state. The last crude,
FO USGC, is an average of wellhead prices for crudes produced in Federally controlled offshore
leases in the Gulf of Mexico. Because the coastal crudes are already located on the Gulf Coast
and in close proximity to refineries and deepwater ports, these crudes are typically not brought
to a trading hub in the way that WTI and WTS are. Instead they are typically bought directly
from the producer by local refineries.17 Thus, unlike the mid-continent crudes, coastal crudes are
constrained only by the export ban, not pipeline capacity. Though FO USGC crude prices became
more volatile over the last few years, they do not appear to have developed any sustained discount
at all.
3.2 Shipping and Refining Constraint Variables
Our empirical goal is to distinguish the roles of transportation and refining constraints in generating
crude oil price differentials. We capture these with two variables from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA).
The first variable relates to shipping. EIA provides estimates of all crude movements between
PADD regions. These crude movements are broken up into three primary categories: pipeline,
tanker, and rail. We consider movements from PADD 2 (the Midwest) and PADD 4 (Rocky
Mountain states) to PADD 3 (the Gulf Coast). Movements from PADDs 2 and 4 to PADD 3
represents the movements of crude produced in the mid-continent, primarily from the Bakken
and Niobrara shale plays, towards the Gulf Coast where more than half of the country’s refining
capacity resides. To represent the presence of pipeline constraints, we consider the volume of crude
movements from PADDs 2 and 4 to PADD 3 via barge or rail as a share of total movements:
other sharet =
Tankert +Railt
Tankert +Railt + Pipelinet
.
17There are some exceptions. In particular, some crude is now traded at the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port.
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Because barge and rail are high-cost modes of transport, if this ratio is above zero, especially for
a sustained period of time, this suggests that pipeline constraints are likely present. Our measure
of pipeline constraints is a much more direct measure of this constraint than the proxy previous
academic studies have used, which is the level of crude inventories at Cushing (Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al.,
2013; Fattouh, 2007, 2009; Kao and Wan, 2012).
The next explanatory variable represents potential refining constraints: it is the weighted aver-
age API gravity of crude input into refineries (apit). If we find a that this weighted average of API
gravity has explanatory power in predicting price differentials, then this provides evidence that it
is refining constraints, not transportation constraints that caused the large price differentials.18
4 Empirical strategy
Our analysis of domestic crude oil price differentials proceeds in three stages. In the first stage,
we estimate the statistical relationship between domestic crudes and Brent crude for the pre-shale
1990–2006 period. We assume that the market was in a long-run equilibrium during this time, that
subsequent deviations from this are due to constraints, and that the market will return to its initial
equilibrium once all constraints are relieved. Using this pre-boom relationship, we construct price
differentials. In the second stage, we test for breaks in the level and trend of price differentials at
the beginning of the “shale boom” and at the time when pipeline investments relieved the shipping
constraints.19 In the third stage, we decompose deviations of the price differentials from zero into
shipping and refining constraints. In all of our regressions we compute our standard errors using
an Andrews (1991) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimator to correct
for the effects of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.2021
Our empirical strategy is similar in spirit to Bausell et al. (2001), who examine the impact
of lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on the prices of Alaskan crude and West Coast refined
products, though our situation and methodology differ. First, Bausell et al. (2001) study a market
in a constrained, steady-state equilibrium which experiences a sudden relief in the constraint and
moves to a new steady-state. In constrast, our period of interest is not at all a steady-state.
18There is no one variable that captures the distribution of hydrocarbon inputs to refineries. Public EIA data on
the quality of refining inputs is coarse, and it is not possible to accurately describe the distribution of molecular
weights of refinery inputs from the aggregate measures provided. We did try imputing measures of heavy products
(vacuum gas oil and residuum) exiting the primary refinery atmospheric distillation units to detect changes in the
distribution of crude gravity. Like API gravity, these had no meaningful explanatory power. Furthermore, refinery
analysts inform us that our imputed variables are poor measures of crude oil input quality, so we have not included
them.
19The time-series are not long enough for us to test for a post-ban break, though this is a logical next-step.
20We implement the estimator with the Stata package lrcov (Wang and Wu, 2012).
21In Tables 6 and 7, listed in the Appendix, we also add try adding two lagged values of PDc,t to parametrically
account for autocorrelation. This reduces the magnitudes and significance of the explanatory variables, but does not
cause signs to change or change the fact that shipping constraints are significant at at least the 5% level for all grades
except HLS.
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Over our time frame, increasing shale production would have caused market constraints, be they
pipeline or export constraints, to bind ever more tightly. Then, those constraints would have been
gradually relieved over time by incremental investments into pipelines and refineries. This means
our constraint cannot be captured with a simple indicator variable for the post-ban period. One
way we address this is to allow for two breaks in both mean and trend of the series. Second, we
are interested in disentangling the impacts of two different constraints: shipping as well as refining
constraints, which were driven by the export ban. Third, we differ somewhat our modeling choices
for standard errors: rather than explicitly model conditional heteroskedasticity with a GARCH
model, we instead use a robust, HAC estimator for the variance.
Our research question and empirical approach are also related to Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al. (2013);
however, there are important differences. Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al. (2013) are primarily concerned with
decomposing the spread between Brent and WTI prompt month futures prices into physical, fi-
nancial, and macroeconomic components. As we do, they note that structural breaks in mean
WTI–Brent and LLS–Brent spreads are different. In the main portion of the paper, the authors
regress daily prices from April 2004 through April 2012 on 19 different variables, including global
spare oil capacity, crude oil inventories at Cushing, and measures of contango. They do not test
whether the export ban had any impact on crude differentials. Our paper focuses only on the
physical market: we test whether internal or external physical constraints better explain the large
Brent–WTI differential and discuss the implications of our results for policy on infrastructure in-
vestment and export controls. Thus, we use a smaller set of explanatory variables exclusively
relating to the physical market—transportation costs and refining inefficiencies. Finally, our data
are available over a much longer horizon and a wider geography. This allows us to estimate uncon-
strained long-run relationships, see how constraints vary across space, and capture the tightening
and loosening of pipeline constraints.
4.1 Estimating long-run relationships
An absolute version of the Law of One Price (LOOP) means that the price of crude oil in one
market must move one-for-one in another. If LOOP holds, then the difference in crude prices,
Pc,t−Pbrent,t, must be stationary and cannot have a unit root. Otherwise, the two markets are not
well-arbitraged. In econometric terms, it must be that22
Pc,t − Pbrent,t = µ+ t. (1)
The mean price differential, µ, represents differences in crude oil quality and any steady-state trans-
portation costs. The shock, t, is mean-zero and may exhibit autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
22We considered estimating our model using the logarithm of oil prices; however, the absolute version of LOOP was
rejected in all cases. Given our strong priors that an absolute version of LOOP should hold, particularly for Brent
and WTI, we chose to estimate our model in levels. This is also the functional form used by Bausell et al. (2001).
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Before proceeding, we check the unit root properties of the weekly average of each crude oil
price using a Dickey-Fuller test. The null hypothesis of a unit root during 1990–2006 and the full
sample cannot be rejected at the 10% level.23 The t-statistic for this test is included in Table 5
of summary statistics. Then for each weekly domestic crude oil price, Pc,t, we use Dynamic OLS
(Stock and Watson, 1993; Saikkonen, 1991) to estimate the following cointegrating relationship for
the pre-shale period 1990–2006 when the market was in its long-run equilibrium:
Pc,t = µ+ δPbrent,t
l∑
j=−l
pijPbrent,t−j + t (2)
To verify our assumption that LOOP holds, we test that δ = 1 under the assumption that Pc,t
and Pbrent,t are cointegrated. A cross-correlogram suggests that the appropriate number of leads
and lags of Brent crude differences is l = 2, and we calculate our standard errors using a HAC
matrix computed using a Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) automatic bandwidth selection.24
An Engle-Granger test for a spurious relationship between Pc,t and Pbrent,t is simply a Dickey-
Fuller test applied to the estimated residuals equation (2). The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values
for 200 observations are -3.954, -3.368, and -3.067, respectively (Enders, 2008). We reject the null
of no cointegration at the 1% level for our six series. This confirms that a relative form of LOOP
holds for all six crudes at minimum.
Table 1 shows the regression results. In addition to confirming that LOOP holds, we fail to
reject the null hypothesis that δ = 1 for WTI Midland, WTI Cushing and HLS. For these three,
we compute price differentials as
PDc,t = Pc,t − Pbrent,t. (3)
Equation (3) shows that the price differential, PDc,t, is an estimate of µ+ t.
For the other three crudes, WTS, LLS, and FO USGC, we reject the null hypothesis that δ = 0
in favor of the alternative of a shallower slopes (δ < 1). This means that only a relative version of
LOOP holds. For these, we compute price differentials as
PDc,t = Pc,t − δˆcPbrent,t. (4)
Since δˆc is a superconsistent estimator of the true δc, sampling error from estimating δ will not
affect the consistency or distribution of our estimator when we use PDc,t as the dependent variable
in subsequent regressions.
23There has been a robust debate about the stationarity properties of oil prices after Perron (1989) showed that
one can reject a unit root if trends and structural breaks are allowed. Noguera (2013) and Ghoshray (2014) confirm
this. The unit root properties of oil prices, however, are not the central focus of this paper. Thus, whether oil prices
truly have unit roots is somewhat moot in this context.
24This was implemented using the cointreg command in Stata’s lrcov package.
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Table 1: Loop regressions for 1990m1–2006m12
Mid-continent Gulf Coast
WTI Cushing WTI Midland WTS LLS HLS FO USGC
δ 1.007∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗
(0.00965) (0.00830) (0.00727) (0.00694) (0.00651) (0.0108)
µ 1.403∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 1.400∗∗∗ 0.398
(0.276) (0.237) (0.208) (0.198) (0.186) (0.308)
N 199 199 199 199 199 199
zδ−1 0.680 1.032 -11.12 3.158 -1.207 -5.661
Pr(|z|) 0.497 0.302 9.72e-29 0.00159 0.228 1.51e-08
D-Fuller -5.082 -6.639 -6.820 -6.958 -7.112 -9.298
Standard errors in parentheses
Dynamic OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection.
zδ−1 is a t-test for absolute version of LOOP, and δ chosen based on rejection
of Absolote LOOP at 0.01 level
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4.2 Testing for constraints with breakpoints
Having verified that LOOP holds during the pre-shale period, we now assume that the crude oil
market is, in fact, well-arbitraged, and that any change in the mean price differential, µ from
equation (1), is due to temporary changes in the marginal cost of arbitraging price differences—
either marginal transportation costs or the marginal cost of refining a lighter-than-normal grade of
crude oil. In both empirical specifications, we relax the assumption that the mean price differential
is constant since we are examining a period of transition when pipeline and refinery constraints are
likely to have first become more binding and then, less binding. Thus, in our first model we allow
for µ to have a broken time trend and denote it as µt. We denote the set of break-times as {Te}Ee=0
and follow the convention that the first and last break times are the start and end of our sample:
T0 = 0 and TE = T . A regime e includes the set of months t ∈ {Te + 1, . . . , Te+1}. This implies
that there are up to E − 1 intervals and gives us our first econometric specification:
PDc,t =
E−1∑
e=0
1 [Te < t ≤ Te+1] (αc,e + βc,et) + νIke/Gustavct + νKatrina/Ritact + c,t, (5)
where 1 [Te < t ≤ Te+1] represents a dummy variable that takes the value 1 only when t falls within
regime e and 0 otherwise, and the parameters ν
Ike/Gustav
t and ν
Katrina/Rita
t capture the effect of
US Gulf Coast hurricanes Ike and Gustav (September 2008) and Katrina and Rita (September—
October 2005) which temporarly impacted Gulf Coast refining.
We allow for two structural breaks that partition our sample into three separate time periods.
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The first break date marks the end of the “pre-shale boom” period and the onset of the “initial
shale boom” period. We date this break at January 2007, which is when the U.S. EIA’s Drilling
Productivity Report began tracking U.S. shale production.25 Figure 2 shows that the increase in
oil production begins around this time. The second breakpoint is May of 2012 when the Seaway
Pipeline was reversed. Historically, the Seaway pipeline moved crude from Freeport, TX (on the
Gulf Coast) to Cushing, Oklahoma (in the mid-continent). The reversal expanded capacity for the
glut of new crude production in the mid-continent to reach the Gulf Coast, and it was the first of
several such investments in pipeline capacity. The third event is the lifting of the export ban in
December of 2015, and marks the end of the time period considered in this analysis. This timeline
is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Structural Break Time Periods
Time Period Event Description
January 1990 to
December 2006
Pre-Shale Boom Era EIA’s drilling productivity re-
port begins tracking shale play
production in 2007.
January 2007 to
April 2012
Shale Boom and Pre-
Pipeline Upgrades
In April of 2012, the Seaway
Pipeline was reversed. Through-
out the next several years, other
significant reversals and up-
grades were also completed.
May 2012 to De-
cember 2015
Shale Boom and
Pipeline Upgrades
Occurring
The export ban was lifted in De-
cember of 2015.
Our initial testing step involves detecting the presence of structural breaks in the time trends.
This is a test of the null that βe = βe′∀e 6= e′ versus the alternative that βe 6= βe′ for some e 6= e′.
We expect structural breaks to be present in the mid-continent crudes since these were affected by
both types of constraints; however, we only expect structural breaks in coastal crudes if the export
ban played a part in causing domestic crude discounts.
Our second step is to examine specific hypotheses about the signs and relative magnitudes of
level and trend coefficients (αe and βe). In the pre-shale boom time period (January 1990 through
December 2006) we expect for lighter domestic crudes to trade at a slight premium on average to
Brent: αc,0 > 0. More importantly, the price differential should remain approximately constant
over this pre-shale period for all crudes: βc,0 = 0∀c.
During the initial shale boom period before the internal shipping constraints are alleviated
(January 2007 through April 2012), we hypothesize that crudes located inland (hereafter referred to
as “mid-continent crudes”) will sell at increasing discounts due to shipping and refining constraints:
25Accessible online at http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/.
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βmid,1 < 0. Since mid-continent crudes face additional constraints compared to coastal crudes, we
hypothesize that βmid,1 ≤ βgulf,1. If refinery constraints are binding, Gulf Coast crudes will also
sell at an increasing discount and βgulf,1 < 0. This would mean that lifting the export ban would
have plausibly relieved this constraint, allowing these Gulf Coast crudes to sell to foreign buyers
(of course, to the extent this differential exceeded transportation costs). However, if there is no
constraint in the refineries inability to process this crude, the we would expect for βgulf,1 = 0.
Thus, the difference between βgulf,1 − βmid,1 represents the difference in the rate at which pipeline
constraints bound more than refinery constraints.
The last regime coincides with the time of pipeline reversals and upgrades and before the export
ban was lifted, from May 2012 to December 2015. If the transportation constraints were binding
for the mid-continent crudes, and therefore were responsible for some share of their price discount,
we would expect for these mid-continent crude prices to begin to converge to Brent during this
time where these transportation constraints were being alleviated, so βmid,2 > 0. However, if these
transportation constraints were not responsible for the price differential, but instead the export
ban, we would expect for the price differential to persist, βmid,2 = 0.
4.3 Testing for pipeline vs refining constraints
For this specification, instead of using time-trends and breaks, we decompose the price differen-
tials into the two components corresponding to increased marginal transport and refining costs.
Specifically, for crude c at time t, we decompose the price differential as
PDc,t = α0 + γ
ship
c other sharet + γ
api
c apit + ν
Ike/Gustav
ct + ν
Katrina/Rita
ct + c,t. (6)
where k ∈ {other share, api}.
The first explanatory variable is the share of crude oil movements via rail and barge from
the mid-continent (PADDs 2 and 4) to the Gulf Coast (PADD 3), shown previously in Figure 4.
Though this variable does not capture possible constraints in moving new Texas and New Mexico
production from the Permian Basin and Eagle Ford Shale regions, it does capture constraints in
moving new crude oil supplies from the prolific Bakken Shale in North Dakota and inventory build
at Cushing, Oklahoma where WTI is priced. Because shipping crude via barge or rail is more
costly than via pipeline, we expect that mid-continent discounts will grow as more crude is moved
via these two modes. Conversely, we expect the discount to shrink as the share via barge and rail
attenuates. This is equivalent to γshipmid < 0. At the same time, we do not expect Gulf Coast crudes
to be nearly as affected by mid-continent to Gulf Coast pipeline capacity. Therefore, we expect
that γshipmid < γ
ship
gulf ≤ 0.
The weighted average API of refining inputs captures PADD 3 refining constraints. The coeffi-
cient γapi measures the association between these variables and domestic price premiums. If these
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refineries were not able to perfectly substitute their previous grades of crude for domestic LTOs,
then changes API of inputs should depress domestic crudes compared to Brent.
5 Results
Breaks in trend Table 3 presents the baseline results for equation (5). Given how dummy
variables are constructed, in any regime e, the corresponding level term is αc,e, and the trend
term, βc,e. The bottom portion of the table shows the results from Wald tests for equality of the
time-trends. For both HLS and FO USGC, we find no evidence of any structural breaks in the
time-trend. This suggests that neither crude was impacted by pipeline or refining constraints.
The other four crudes, WTI Cushing, WTI Midland, WTS, and LLS do display some evidence of
strucutral breaks. We very strongly reject equality of any trend coefficients for both WTI series.
While we only reject β0 = β1 at the 5% level for WTS, we strongly reject the two null hypotheses
β1 = β2 and β0 = β1 = β2. LLS also appears to exhibit some breaks in trend, though statistical
evidence for these is somewhat weaker, which is consistent with our hypothesis that LLS was not
affected by transportation constraints.
As expected αˆ0 > 0 for all crudes except FO USGC (in which case it is positive, but not
statistically different from zero). This means that in the pre-shale time period, domestic crudes
(except for FO USGC) traded on average at higher prices relative to Brent. In addition, we fail to
reject the hypothesis that β0 = 0 for all crudes. This provides evidence that price differentials were
stable in the pre-shale time period.
For WTI and WTS, we find evidence of significant devaluation in the post-shale boom time
period before transportation constraint alleviations began: βˆ1 < 0. More specifically, we estimate
that WTI Cushing was losing value relative to Brent at a rate of about $3.50 per year.26 WTI Mid-
land experiences a similar $3.85/year devaluation per year over this time period. WTS experience
devaluation at a slightly slower rate, of about $2.39/year over this time period.
Results for Gulf Coast crudes differ significantly from results for mid-continent crudes. We
estimate that LLS decreased in price relative to Brent crude at a rate of about $0.59 per year.
This is a much smaller magnitude than for the mid-continent crudes. HLS and FO USGC do
not experience a statistically significant decrease at all. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that transportation constraints in the mid-continent played primary role in generating
price differentials.
Next, we turn to β2, the rate at which domestic crude prices rose as pipeline constraints eased
over the May 2012–December 2015 period. WTI Cushing, WTI Midland, and WTS rose in value
quickly relative to Brent: estimated rates are between $4.96 and $5.74 per year. This recovery was
substantially faster than the rate at which these prices fell during the initial boom period. The
26Recall that the time-trend, t, is measured in years.
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Table 3: Price differential break tests, OLS
Mid-continent Gulf Coast
WTI Cushing WTI Midland WTS∗ LLS∗ HLS FO USGC∗
Level
α0 1.223
∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 1.210∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.209∗∗∗ 0.275
(0.179) (0.143) (0.222) (0.129) (0.133) (0.208)
α1 64.79
∗∗ 71.18∗∗ 47.07∗ 12.35∗∗ 2.858 -2.709
(21.44) (23.26) (22.02) (4.360) (2.625) (9.996)
α2 -129.9
∗∗∗ -150.6∗∗∗ -124.5∗∗∗ -17.83 4.449 17.26
(14.30) (13.26) (17.82) (13.60) (10.79) (14.25)
Trend
β0 0.0389 0.0343 0.0297 0.0123 -0.00134 0.00728
(0.0309) (0.0261) (0.0244) (0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0308)
β1 -3.499
∗∗ -3.847∗∗ -2.394∗ -0.591∗∗ -0.0484 0.231
(1.106) (1.204) (1.132) (0.223) (0.127) (0.486)
β2 5.012
∗∗∗ 5.741∗∗∗ 4.954∗∗∗ 0.609 -0.247 -0.702
(0.587) (0.535) (0.716) (0.561) (0.444) (0.580)
Ike/Gustav Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Katrina/Rita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 312 312 312 312 312 312
χ2(6) 33.67 37.31 33.75 24.82 21.84 23.54
(0.00000778) (0.00000153) (0.00000751) (0.000369) (0.00129) (0.000636)
Fβ0=β1 10.03 10.25 4.529 6.987 0.133 0.211
(0.00170) (0.00151) (0.0341) (0.00864) (0.715) (0.646)
Fβ1=β2 36.73 49.97 24.15 4.408 0.175 1.425
(4.01e-09) (1.07e-11) (0.00000146) (0.0366) (0.676) (0.233)
Fβ0=β1=β2 36.10 59.90 23.67 4.625 0.238 0.819
(8.60e-15) (1.17e-22) (2.80e-10) (0.0105) (0.788) (0.442)
Standard errors in parentheses for coefficients, and p-values for test-statistics.
Significance tests against normal distribution: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection.
χ2(6) is Cumby and Huizinga (1992) statistic for autocorrelation of order 6
Starred dependent variables computed using initial LOOP regressions in Table 1
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Table 4: Price differential decomposition: OLS
Mid-continent Gulf Coast
WTI Cushing WTI Midland WTS∗ LLS∗ HLS FO USGC∗
γship -31.12∗∗∗ -37.86∗∗∗ -20.97∗∗∗ -9.225∗∗∗ -4.098+ 1.345
(3.957) (3.235) (4.369) (2.042) (2.282) (2.446)
γapi -0.344 -0.687∗ -0.733+ -0.361∗ -0.311∗ -0.384
(0.264) (0.315) (0.382) (0.143) (0.153) (0.252)
α0 12.57 23.20
∗ 24.96∗ 12.51∗∗ 10.99∗ 12.41
(8.324) (9.903) (12.14) (4.518) (4.821) (7.974)
Ike/Gustav Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Katrina/Rita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 312 312 312 312 312 312
χ2(6) 29.67 31.61 28.66 23.07 31.24 22.61
(0.0000454) (0.0000194) (0.0000706) (0.000772) (0.0000228) (0.000939)
R2 0.729 0.760 0.484 0.516 0.221 0.160
R2ship 0.725 0.748 0.455 0.479 0.178 0.145
R2ref 0.00567 0.00548 0.00461 0.0157 0.0722 0.156
Standard errors in parentheses for coefficients, and p-values for test-statistics.
Significance tests against normal distribution: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection.
χ2(6) is Cumby and Huizinga (1992) statistic for autocorrelation of order 6
Starred dependent variables computed using initial LOOP regressions in Table 1
25
trend coefficients for LLS, HLS, and FO USGC are not statistically different from zero, suggesting
that relief of transportation constraints did not increase the price of these crudes.
Transport vs. refining Table 4 shows estimates for equation (6), which decomposes the price
differential into marginal shipping costs and marginal refining costs. Recall that we capture these
two factors by the share of rail plus tanker crude oil movements from PADDs 2 and 4 to PADD 3
and the Average API gravity of refining inputs in PADD 3.
The shipping constraint coefficient, γship, is statistically significantly and negatively associated
with price differentials for the three mid-continent crudes, as well as LLS. It is negative and statis-
tically significant at the 10% level for HLS, but it is not significant at any conventional levels for
FO USGC. Our estimates of γship suggest that a 10% increase in the share of crude being shipped
from the mid-continent to Gulf Coast via rail and barge is associated with a $2.01 to $3.79 dollar
per barrel discount relative to Brent for our three mid-continent crudes. Rail and barge made up
60% of crude oil movements at one point in time, which would have corresponded to a $12.58–22.72
per barrel discount. This is an economically significant amount. Pipeline constraints do appear to
have impacted LLS, with a 10% increase in the share of rail and barge shipping leading to a $0.92
per barrel discount—a much smaller amount than for the mid-continent crudes. HLS may have
developed a minor discount to Brent due to shipping constraints, but FO USGC appears not to
have been affected in the slightest.
Table 4 also shows the relationship between the API gravity of refinery inputs and crude price
differentials. We do find that increases in API gravity (i.e. movement towards lighter crudes) is
associated with a discount in domestic crudes relative to Brent. The corresponding coefficient, γapic ,
is significant at the 5% level for WTI Midland, LLS, and HLS, but not WTI Cushing or FO USGC.
It is statistically significant at the 10% level for WTS. As Figure 2 shows, between January 2006 and
December 2015, the average API of PADD 3 refinery inputs ranged between approximately 29 and
32.5. With estimates for γapi ranging from -0.73 to -0.31, this implies that the maximum discount
due to increased average API gravity of crude oil inputs to refining would have reached $2.57, an
order of magnitude below the maximum discount due to shipping constraints. That being said, it
is important to remember that changes in refinery inputs have persisted, and pipeline constraints
have not. Thus, what the refining constraint lacks in intensity, it makes up in longevity.
Robustness: serial correlation Our estimates of equations (5) and (6) both suffer from serial
correlation of the residuals, as evidenced by the Cumby and Huizinga (1992) statistics in the bottom
of Tables 3 and 4. While the Andrews (1991) HAC estimator corrects standard errors for this issue,
we also try parametrically correcting for serial correlation by adding two lags of PDc,t and re-
estimating our model (still with the HAC standard errors). Results are given in Tables 6 and 7 in
the Appendix. Because adjustment of price differentials is now dynamic, the relevant quantities of
interest are the long-run multipliers, not the simple coefficients. Given a generic coefficient, γ, the
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associated long-run multiplier is
γLRM =
γ
1− ρ1 − ρ2 .
The long-run multipliers are very close to the coefficients estimated in static regressions (Tables 3
and 4), so we are comfortable that our results are robust to serial correlation.
Robustness: other crudes As mentioned, we repeat our analysis for all of the geography-
specific crude oil prices reported by the EIA at the monthly level (plus the six main prices we focus
on). The majority of these are state or PADD-specific average crude oil wellhead prices. Summary
statistics are given in Table 8 of Appendix A.2. Table 9 gives results from our stage one pre-shale
model, equation (1). We compute price differentials from these quantities exactly as before and
estimate models (5) and (6) both without lags (Tables 10 and 11) and with lags (Tables 12 and
13). We find qualitatively similar results as before. Crudes along the US Gulf Coast (AL, LA, and
MS) do exhibit strucutral breaks, but rejection of the null of no breaks is weaker than for inland
crudes, and the trend in the post-pipeline regime is not statistically different from zero. Statistical
support for breaks in PADD 5 crudes is much weaker, and a number of the trend terms have the
opposite signs from mid-continent crudes. Similarly, we find smaller magnitudes for our shipping
constraint coefficient (γship) with Gulf Coast and PADD 5 crudes. It is interesting to note that
CA Midway-Sunset crude, a heavy crude stream, actually appears to gain in value compared to
Brent when pipeline constraints bind. In contrast, the coefficient on API gravity, γapi, has limited
statistical significance for all regressions, and is not significant at all for most. In total, these results
support our conclusion that crude-oil discounts were mainly related to shipping constraints, not
export (refining) constraints.
5.1 Decomposition
To decompose the relative effects of shipping constraints and the export ban, we shut down each of
the respective channels and compute the predicted price differential using our regression coefficients.
When we shut down one of the variables, we set it to its mean during the pre-shale period January
1990 to December 2006. We compute these decompositions27 as
P̂D
shipping
ct = αˆ0 + γˆ
ship
c other sharet + γˆ
api
c api+ ν̂
Ike/Gustav
ct + ν̂
Katrina/Rita
ct (7)
P̂D
refining
ct = αˆ0 + γˆ
ship
c other share+ γˆ
api
c apit + ν̂
Ike/Gustav
ct + ν̂
Katrina/Rita
ct . (8)
27Note, our two decompositions are not true counterfactuals because we do not know how refiners would have
handled additional LTO volumes should pipeline constraints not have existed. Knowing this would require knowledge
of the parameters characterizing the short-run and long-run marginal costs of incorporating additional LTO barrels
in refining slates. Thus, our estimates should be taken as a decomposition of the crude differentials under a particular
set of circumstances.
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The two decompositions are graphed in Figures 7a and 7b for each price differential. To measure
the explanatory power of each variable, we also compute pseudo R2 measures as the squared
correlations between PDct and P̂D
shipping
ct or P̂D
refining
ct , and we compare them with the original
regression R2 in Table 4. Both the table and the graph show that the ability of shipping constraints
to explain the price differentials is usually at least an order of magnitude greater than refining
constraints for all crudes except FO USGC, which is equally (un)related to shipping and refining
constraints.28
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate two plausible causes for the significant price discount of U.S. crudes
during the U.S. “shale boom” and evaluate how much each mattered. Some studies have claimed
that the price differential was due to refineries’ inability to process light tight oils (LTOs) being
produced at record levels from shale plays. These studies postulate that the alleviation of the
export ban could have eliminated this price differential. Other studies, though, have associated
price differentials with transportation constraints within the U.S. that were gradually alleviated
due to pipeline reversals and upgrades. We provide the first statistical decomposition of these
differentials into these two competing factors.
Based on the pseudo-R2 measures that we calculate, it appears that that around half to three-
quarters of the domestic mid-continent crude oil to Brent price differential can be explained by
internal pipeline constraints, while only a few percent of the differential can be explained by re-
fineries’ inability to absorb the glut of domestic LTOs as captured by PADD-specific average API
gravity of inputs to refineries. It is plausible that part of the price differential associated with
refineries’ inability to absorb domestic LTOs could have been alleviated if the export ban were not
to have been in place during the export ban, though it is unlikely that this would have had as large
of an effect in the short run compared to relieving pipeline constraints.
There are significant policy implications of this research. First and foremost, results of this
research suggest that with or without the crude export ban in place, significant price differentials
would have emerged between U.S. and foreign crudes. In particular, we argue that the price differ-
entials between mid-continent and Gulf Coast crudes were mostly associated with transportation
bottlenecks within the U.S.
Second, Gulf Coast crudes may have been impacted by the export ban, but the magnitudes of
these impacts were likely small and short lived. LLS and HLS did sell at a discount to Brent, but
this to a much smaller degree than for mid-continent crudes. Depending on the cost to ship Gulf
Coast crudes abroad, this discount may or may not have justified exporting crudes and incurring
higher, international shipping costs.
28The pattern is the same when we examine all of the EIA price differentials (Table 11, with the notable exception
of South Dakota, which is a minor oil-producer.)
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Figure 7: Predicted differentials using only one set of explanatory variables (plus hurricane dum-
mies)
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There are two important limitations to our empirical approach. First, we are only able to
observe average trading prices, aggregate shipping and aggregate refinery input data. The strong
statistical significance of our shipping constraint variable allays concern about whether we have
adequately captured this factor. However, the lack of a statistical “smoking gun” for the impact of
refining constraints is more problematic. Refinery processes, inputs, and outputs are much more
complex and heterogeneous than simple pipeline movements, and refiners are able to adjust their
process over time to increase efficiency. Thus, what may be a sub-optimal crude slate at one time
may become an optimal crude slate at another. In contrast, rail and tanker transport of crude over
longer distances is always more costly than pipeline transport.
Second, our results are more concerned with the market-level effects of the export ban on
domestic crude prices, not the effects of the crude ban on particular producers or refiners. Some
producers may have had capacity rights on pipelines and been less affected by differentials. Some
individual refiners may have already been set up to handle lighter crude slates and not required
steep discounts to handle additional LTOs. Thus, these results should not be used to argue that
individual producers were not adversely impacted by the export ban, but instead that in aggregate,
internal shipping constraints can explain a significant share of observed price differentials.
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A Appendix: For Online Publication Only
A.1 Additional Tables and Figures
Table 5: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max N D-Fuller Pr(DFuller) First obs. Last obs.
Brent 47.80 34.88 9.80 133.90 312 -1.29 0.63 1990m1 2015m12
Mid-continent crudes
WTI Cushing 46.78 31.07 11.31 133.93 312 -1.40 0.58 1990m1 2015m12
WTI Midland 46.16 30.37 11.06 134.11 312 -1.45 0.56 1990m1 2015m12
WTS 44.24 30.16 10.07 131.15 312 -1.48 0.54 1990m1 2015m12
Coastal crudes
LLS 49.34 34.63 11.27 137.99 312 -1.31 0.63 1990m1 2015m12
HLS 48.79 34.64 11.00 136.92 312 -1.32 0.62 1990m1 2015m12
FO USGC 45.61 33.34 9.48 130.06 312 -1.20 0.67 1990m1 2015m12
Explanatory variables
Avg API: PADD 3 30.95 1.15 28.96 33.69 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Rail/Tanker share from PADDs 2 & 4 to PADD 3 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.60 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Dickey-Fuller test is for null hypothesis of a unit root.
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Table 6: Price differential break tests, AR(2)
Mid-continent Gulf Coast
WTI Cushing WTI Midland WTS∗ LLS∗ HLS FO USGC∗
Level
α0 0.264
∗ 0.239∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.138
(0.104) (0.0840) (0.105) (0.0933) (0.110) (0.119)
α1 14.86
∗∗ 16.72∗∗ 12.59∗ 3.887∗ 1.149 -1.897
(5.388) (5.777) (5.243) (1.611) (1.493) (5.728)
α2 -26.98
∗ -31.04∗ -27.31∗ -8.958+ -0.254 4.857
(11.27) (13.97) (12.63) (5.054) (5.410) (14.59)
Trend
β0 0.00377 0.00429 0.00358 0.00147 -0.00116 -0.000275
(0.00971) (0.00802) (0.0103) (0.00859) (0.00981) (0.0188)
β1 -0.805
∗∗ -0.906∗∗ -0.646∗ -0.188∗ -0.0175 0.144
(0.282) (0.304) (0.272) (0.0820) (0.0749) (0.292)
β2 1.052
∗ 1.195∗ 1.094∗ 0.331 -0.0168 -0.198
(0.441) (0.549) (0.504) (0.203) (0.222) (0.594)
Lags
ρ1 1.015
∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗
(0.0823) (0.0837) (0.101) (0.130) (0.117) (0.105)
ρ2 -0.219
∗ -0.329∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗ -0.0743 -0.153 -0.149
(0.0992) (0.0946) (0.105) (0.0960) (0.0961) (0.0924)
Ike/Gustav Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Katrina/Rita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 310 310 310 310 310 310
χ2(6) 1.549 2.269 3.092 2.574 2.013 3.007
(0.956) (0.893) (0.797) (0.860) (0.918) (0.808)
Fβ0=β1 8.120 8.900 5.684 5.251 0.0470 0.245
(0.00468) (0.00309) (0.0177) (0.0226) (0.829) (0.621)
Fβ1=β2 9.545 9.071 8.695 5.419 0.0000107 0.243
(0.00219) (0.00282) (0.00344) (0.0206) (0.997) (0.623)
Fβ0=β1=β2 5.151 5.418 4.825 3.768 0.0266 0.160
(0.00632) (0.00488) (0.00866) (0.0242) (0.974) (0.853)
Standard errors in parentheses for coefficients, and p-values for test-statistics.
Significance tests against normal distribution: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection.
χ2(6) is Cumby and Huizinga (1992) statistic for autocorrelation of order 6
Starred dependent variables computed using initial LOOP regressions in Table 1
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Table 7: Price differential decomposition, AR(2)
Mid-continent Gulf Coast
WTI Cushing WTI Midland WTS∗ LLS∗ HLS FO USGC∗
γship -5.747∗∗ -8.082∗∗∗ -4.421∗∗ -2.648∗∗∗ -1.411∗ 0.468
(1.984) (2.077) (1.383) (0.662) (0.579) (1.599)
γapi -0.0124 -0.105 -0.123 -0.0526 -0.0618 -0.160
(0.0779) (0.0775) (0.0799) (0.0425) (0.0445) (0.124)
ρ1 1.038
∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.0875) (0.0911) (0.104) (0.105) (0.107) (0.101)
ρ2 -0.230
∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗ -0.0562 -0.0946 -0.145
(0.0937) (0.0861) (0.0982) (0.0863) (0.0951) (0.0916)
α0 0.717 3.655 4.270
+ 1.993 2.329 5.202
(2.516) (2.483) (2.558) (1.365) (1.419) (3.940)
Ike/Gustav Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Katrina/Rita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 310 310 310 310 310 310
χ2(6) 1.787 1.513 2.837 3.420 4.526 2.779
(0.938) (0.959) (0.829) (0.755) (0.606) (0.836)
γ˜shipLRM -30.02 -37.65 -20.86 -9.607 -4.596 0.979
(5.118) (5.518) (5.566) (2.250) (2.117) (3.336)
γ˜apiLRM -0.0650 -0.490 -0.578 -0.191 -0.201 -0.335
(0.394) (0.315) (0.343) (0.142) (0.142) (0.260)
Standard errors in parentheses for coefficients, and p-values for test-statistics.
Significance tests against normal distribution: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection.
χ2(6) is Cumby and Huizinga (1992) statistic for autocorrelation of order 6
Starred dependent variables computed using initial LOOP regressions in Table 1
Long-run multipliers and their standard errors are below.
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A.2 All crudes
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Table 8: All variables: summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max N D-Fuller Pr(DFuller) First obs. Last obs.
Brent 47.80 34.88 9.80 133.90 312 -1.29 0.63 1990m1 2015m12
Mid-continent crudes
WTI Cushing 46.78 31.07 11.31 133.93 312 -1.40 0.58 1990m1 2015m12
WTI Midland 46.16 30.37 11.06 134.11 312 -1.45 0.56 1990m1 2015m12
WTS 44.24 30.16 10.07 131.15 312 -1.48 0.54 1990m1 2015m12
Coastal crudes
LLS 49.34 34.63 11.27 137.99 312 -1.31 0.63 1990m1 2015m12
HLS 48.79 34.64 11.00 136.92 312 -1.32 0.62 1990m1 2015m12
FO USGC 45.61 33.34 9.48 130.06 312 -1.20 0.67 1990m1 2015m12
EIA FPP: Stream
CA Midway-Sunset 45.65 33.50 7.05 120.20 267 -1.40 0.58 1993m10 2015m12
WTI (EIA) 48.71 30.97 9.69 132.21 267 -1.43 0.57 1993m10 2015m12
WTS (EIA) 46.85 30.59 8.60 129.56 267 -1.49 0.54 1993m10 2015m12
EIA FPP: PADD 1
PADD 1 43.44 29.57 10.49 130.20 312 -1.38 0.59 1990m1 2015m12
PA 59.53 26.24 18.40 130.11 188 -1.50 0.53 2000m5 2015m12
EIA FPP: PADD 2
PADD 2 43.03 29.16 9.29 128.49 312 -1.45 0.56 1990m1 2015m12
IL 43.31 29.23 9.79 127.60 312 -1.44 0.56 1990m1 2015m12
KS 43.02 29.30 8.98 127.72 312 -1.44 0.56 1990m1 2015m12
KY 42.03 28.72 8.26 123.85 312 -1.44 0.56 1990m1 2015m12
NE 41.19 28.05 8.63 123.77 312 -1.51 0.53 1990m1 2015m12
ND 41.87 28.69 8.62 126.68 312 -1.49 0.54 1990m1 2015m12
OH 43.30 30.03 9.22 129.33 312 -1.37 0.60 1990m1 2015m12
OK 44.33 30.20 9.74 131.37 312 -1.42 0.57 1990m1 2015m12
SD 61.72 24.02 23.31 124.79 163 -1.86 0.35 2002m6 2015m12
EIA FPP: PADD 3
PADD 3 44.53 31.30 9.31 130.79 312 -1.28 0.64 1990m1 2015m12
AL 45.40 33.11 9.15 130.65 312 -1.31 0.62 1990m1 2015m12
LA 46.91 33.56 9.75 133.74 312 -1.33 0.62 1990m1 2015m12
MS 43.78 32.73 7.71 128.91 312 -1.32 0.62 1990m1 2015m12
NM 43.67 29.73 9.08 130.78 312 -1.43 0.57 1990m1 2015m12
TX 44.05 30.63 9.20 131.33 312 -1.40 0.58 1990m1 2015m12
EIA FPP: PADD 4
PADD 4 40.97 27.80 8.56 123.09 312 -1.50 0.53 1990m1 2015m12
CO 43.12 28.54 9.65 126.07 312 -1.45 0.56 1990m1 2015m12
MT 41.29 28.56 8.48 126.80 312 -1.55 0.51 1990m1 2015m12
UT 41.50 26.65 9.25 120.63 312 -1.52 0.52 1990m1 2015m12
WY 39.54 27.18 8.10 120.15 312 -1.59 0.49 1990m1 2015m12
EIA FPP: PADD 5
PADD 5 41.18 33.21 6.17 124.69 312 -1.26 0.65 1990m1 2015m12
AK North Slope 40.25 32.78 5.34 125.77 312 -1.24 0.65 1990m1 2015m12
CA 42.45 33.55 7.38 123.89 312 -1.30 0.63 1990m1 2015m12
FO CA 38.42 31.95 5.01 119.63 305 -1.33 0.61 1990m1 2015m5
Refining
Imputed vacuum gas oil cut (PADD 1, percent) 0.40 0.04 0.26 0.53 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed vacuum gas oil cut (PADD 2, percent) 0.38 0.02 0.33 0.42 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed vacuum gas oil cut (PADD 3, percent) 0.41 0.02 0.36 0.46 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed vacuum gas oil cut (PADD 4, percent) 0.32 0.03 0.25 0.39 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed vacuum gas oil cut (PADD 5, percent) 0.45 0.02 0.38 0.53 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed vacuum gas oil cut (U.S., percent) 0.41 0.01 0.37 0.44 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed residuum cut (PADD 1, percent) 0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.07 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed residuum cut (PADD 2, percent) 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.13 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed residuum cut (PADD 3, percent) 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.15 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed residuum cut (PADD 4, percent) 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.13 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed residuum cut (PADD 5, percent) 0.19 0.01 0.15 0.22 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Imputed residuum cut (U.S., percent) 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.14 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Avg API: PADD 1 32.53 1.23 29.82 35.39 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Avg API: PADD 2 33.15 0.79 31.12 35.06 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Avg API: PADD 3 30.95 1.15 28.96 33.69 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Avg API: PADD 4 33.62 1.06 31.56 36.75 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Avg API: PADD 5 26.86 1.22 23.99 29.71 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Avg API: TXGC 30.25 1.70 26.97 34.23 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Avg API: U.S. 30.94 0.55 29.75 32.23 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Transport
Rail/Tanker share from PADDs 2 & 4 to PADD 3 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.60 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Share of crude via rail / barge out of PADDs 2 + 4 (PADD 2 only) 0.21 0.17 0.00 0.70 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Share of crude via rail / barge out of PADDs 2 + 4 (PADD 4 only) 0.13 0.29 0.00 1.00 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Share of crude via rail / barge out of PADDs 2 + 4 (PADDs 2+4) 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.71 312 . . 1990m1 2015m12
Dickey-Fuller test is for null hypothesis of a unit root.
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Table 9: All crudes: loop regressions for 1990m1–2006m12
δ µ D-Fuller zδ−1 δ N
Mid-continent crudes
WTI Cushing 1.007∗∗∗ (0.00965) 1.403∗∗∗ (0.276) -5.082 0.680 1 199
WTI Midland 1.009∗∗∗ (0.00830) 1.214∗∗∗ (0.237) -6.639 1.032 1 199
WTS 0.919∗∗∗ (0.00727) 1.448∗∗∗ (0.208) -6.820 -11.12∗∗∗ 0.919 199
Coastal crudes
LLS 1.022∗∗∗ (0.00694) 1.159∗∗∗ (0.198) -6.958 3.158∗∗ 1.022 199
HLS 0.992∗∗∗ (0.00651) 1.400∗∗∗ (0.186) -7.112 -1.207 1 199
FO USGC 0.939∗∗∗ (0.0108) 0.398 (0.308) -9.298 -5.661∗∗∗ 0.939 199
EIA FPP: Stream
CA Midway-Sunset 0.883∗∗∗ (0.0239) -1.726 (0.727) -4.600 -4.878∗∗∗ 0.883 154
WTI (EIA) 0.980∗∗∗ (0.0129) 0.630 (0.393) -4.737 -1.567 1 154
WTS (EIA) 0.924∗∗∗ (0.0152) 0.281 (0.461) -4.743 -4.983∗∗∗ 0.924 154
EIA FPP: PADD 1
PADD 1 0.984∗∗∗ (0.0138) 0.153 (0.395) -7.044 -1.131 1 199
PA 0.969∗∗∗ (0.0137) 1.334 (0.545) -4.835 -2.256 1 75
EIA FPP: PADD 2
PADD 2 0.956∗∗∗ (0.0167) 0.486 (0.476) -4.094 -2.656∗∗ 0.956 199
IL 0.909∗∗∗ (0.0140) 1.736∗∗∗ (0.401) -4.461 -6.464∗∗∗ 0.909 199
KS 0.959∗∗∗ (0.0156) 0.247 (0.447) -4.120 -2.632∗∗ 0.959 199
KY 0.885∗∗∗ (0.0131) 1.303∗∗∗ (0.374) -5.029 -8.773∗∗∗ 0.885 199
NE 0.932∗∗∗ (0.0245) 0.134 (0.700) -2.500 -2.765∗∗ 0.932 199
ND 0.927∗∗∗ (0.0275) 0.417 (0.787) -4.209 -2.641∗∗ 0.927 199
OH 0.976∗∗∗ (0.0141) -0.228 (0.404) -6.525 -1.709 1 199
OK 0.990∗∗∗ (0.0150) 0.145 (0.429) -4.609 -0.675 1 199
SD 0.696∗∗∗ (0.0651) 9.975∗∗ (3.055) -2.138 -4.669∗∗∗ 0.696 50
EIA FPP: PADD 3
PADD 3 0.959∗∗∗ (0.0130) 0.204 (0.371) -6.508 -3.133∗∗ 0.959 199
AL 0.993∗∗∗ (0.0109) -0.638 (0.311) -7.581 -0.648 1 199
LA 1.005∗∗∗ (0.0142) 0.0578 (0.406) -6.012 0.320 1 199
MS 0.943∗∗∗ (0.0144) -1.210∗∗ (0.413) -4.802 -3.912∗∗∗ 0.943 199
NM 0.965∗∗∗ (0.0151) 0.396 (0.431) -4.966 -2.326 1 199
TX 0.960∗∗∗ (0.0145) 0.231 (0.416) -5.087 -2.767∗∗ 0.960 199
EIA FPP: PADD 4
PADD 4 0.907∗∗∗ (0.0181) 0.544 (0.518) -3.686 -5.158∗∗∗ 0.907 199
CO 1.007∗∗∗ (0.0165) -0.101 (0.470) -5.644 0.451 1 199
MT 0.934∗∗∗ (0.0271) -0.248 (0.773) -2.775 -2.436 1 199
UT 0.940∗∗∗ (0.0154) 1.268∗∗ (0.439) -2.828 -3.926∗∗∗ 0.940 199
WY 0.817∗∗∗ (0.0219) 1.618∗∗ (0.627) -4.024 -8.338∗∗∗ 0.817 199
EIA FPP: PADD 5
PADD 5 0.951∗∗∗ (0.0340) -4.210∗∗∗ (0.970) -4.618 -1.448 1 199
AK North Slope 0.964∗∗∗ (0.0307) -5.130∗∗∗ (0.878) -5.898 -1.169 1 199
CA 0.926∗∗∗ (0.0330) -2.559∗∗ (0.942) -3.831 -2.243 1 199
FO CA 0.903∗∗∗ (0.0380) -4.570∗∗∗ (1.087) -3.160 -2.544 1 199
Standard errors in parentheses
Dynamic OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection.
zδ−1 is a t-test for absolute version of LOOP, and δ chosen based on rejection of Absolote LOOP at 0.01 level
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: All crudes: price differential break tests, OLS
Intercepts Trends Break tests Stats
α0 α1 α2 β0 β1 β2 Fβ0=β1 Fβ1=β2 Fβ0=β1=β2 N χ
2(6)
Mid-continent crudes
WTI Cushing 1.223∗∗∗ (0.18) 64.79∗∗ (21.44) -129.9∗∗∗ (14.30) 0.0389 (0.03) -3.499∗∗ (1.11) 5.012∗∗∗ (0.59) 10.03∗∗ 36.73∗∗∗ 36.10∗∗∗ 312 33.67∗∗∗
WTI Midland 1.127∗∗∗ (0.14) 71.18∗∗ (23.26) -150.6∗∗∗ (13.26) 0.0343 (0.03) -3.847∗∗ (1.20) 5.741∗∗∗ (0.54) 10.25∗∗ 49.97∗∗∗ 59.90∗∗∗ 312 37.31∗∗∗
WTS 1.210∗∗∗ (0.22) 47.07∗ (22.02) -124.5∗∗∗ (17.82) 0.0297 (0.02) -2.394∗ (1.13) 4.954∗∗∗ (0.72) 4.529∗ 24.15∗∗∗ 23.67∗∗∗ 312 33.75∗∗∗
Coastal crudes
LLS 1.040∗∗∗ (0.13) 12.35∗∗ (4.36) -17.83 (13.60) 0.0123 (0.02) -0.591∗∗ (0.22) 0.609 (0.56) 6.987∗∗ 4.408∗ 4.625∗ 312 24.82∗∗∗
HLS 1.209∗∗∗ (0.13) 2.858 (2.62) 4.449 (10.79) -0.00134 (0.02) -0.0484 (0.13) -0.247 (0.44) 0.133 0.175 0.238 312 21.84∗∗
FO USGC 0.275 (0.21) -2.709 (10.00) 17.26 (14.25) 0.00728 (0.03) 0.231 (0.49) -0.702 (0.58) 0.211 1.425 0.819 312 23.54∗∗∗
EIA FPP: Stream
CA Midway-Sunset -2.694∗∗∗ (0.71) -29.50∗∗∗ (7.18) 65.49∗∗∗ (12.53) 0.0850 (0.09) 1.527∗∗∗ (0.35) -2.646∗∗∗ (0.51) 14.93∗∗∗ 59.77∗∗∗ 30.24∗∗∗ 267 37.17∗∗∗
WTI (EIA) 0.590 (0.61) 62.99∗∗ (20.24) -114.4∗∗∗ (10.98) -0.0580 (0.07) -3.546∗∗∗ (1.05) 4.199∗∗∗ (0.44) 10.51∗∗ 38.49∗∗∗ 45.85∗∗∗ 267 40.91∗∗∗
WTS (EIA) -0.199 (0.62) 49.70∗ (20.57) -121.9∗∗∗ (20.65) 0.0413 (0.08) -2.644∗ (1.06) 4.734∗∗∗ (0.83) 6.098∗ 25.01∗∗∗ 16.98∗∗∗ 267 41.74∗∗∗
EIA FPP: PADD 1
PADD 1 -0.319 (0.47) 69.28∗∗∗ (16.12) -57.81∗∗∗ (10.61) 0.000474 (0.05) -3.976∗∗∗ (0.83) 1.692∗∗∗ (0.44) 22.56∗∗∗ 37.64∗∗∗ 19.71∗∗∗ 312 33.14∗∗∗
PA 3.207∗ (1.42) 83.13∗∗∗ (18.66) -100.4∗∗∗ (17.28) -0.234∗ (0.11) -4.741∗∗∗ (0.95) 3.410∗∗∗ (0.73) 20.54∗∗∗ 53.73∗∗∗ 28.13∗∗∗ 188 33.86∗∗∗
EIA FPP: PADD 2
PADD 2 0.192 (0.34) 63.53∗∗ (19.67) -107.0∗∗∗ (13.00) 0.0305 (0.06) -3.570∗∗∗ (1.02) 3.954∗∗∗ (0.53) 11.90∗∗∗ 32.42∗∗∗ 27.68∗∗∗ 312 45.79∗∗∗
IL 1.691∗∗∗ (0.26) 51.19∗∗ (18.58) -84.66∗∗∗ (21.23) 0.00368 (0.05) -2.733∗∗ (0.96) 3.273∗∗∗ (0.87) 7.906∗∗ 16.35∗∗∗ 8.607∗∗∗ 312 40.51∗∗∗
KS 0.137 (0.37) 58.97∗∗ (18.24) -116.6∗∗∗ (17.33) 0.0124 (0.06) -3.357∗∗∗ (0.94) 4.367∗∗∗ (0.71) 12.18∗∗∗ 32.53∗∗∗ 20.24∗∗∗ 312 37.35∗∗∗
KY 1.727∗∗∗ (0.24) 46.90∗∗ (17.21) -96.80∗∗∗ (19.53) -0.0522 (0.04) -2.531∗∗ (0.89) 3.841∗∗∗ (0.81) 7.635∗∗ 22.01∗∗∗ 12.79∗∗∗ 312 37.38∗∗∗
NE -0.396 (0.53) 47.47∗∗ (17.17) -111.7∗∗∗ (15.70) 0.0585 (0.09) -2.831∗∗ (0.89) 4.097∗∗∗ (0.64) 9.611∗∗ 30.79∗∗∗ 20.92∗∗∗ 312 42.91∗∗∗
ND -0.137 (0.52) 58.40∗∗ (19.29) -91.81∗∗∗ (14.67) 0.0556 (0.10) -3.284∗∗ (1.00) 3.373∗∗∗ (0.60) 10.51∗∗ 23.89∗∗∗ 16.13∗∗∗ 312 49.78∗∗∗
OH -0.0271 (0.34) 57.95∗∗ (18.43) -51.85∗∗∗ (11.14) -0.103∗∗ (0.04) -3.394∗∗∗ (0.95) 1.511∗∗∗ (0.45) 11.78∗∗∗ 18.24∗∗∗ 9.994∗∗∗ 312 32.57∗∗∗
OK -0.415 (0.34) 65.89∗∗∗ (19.68) -134.3∗∗∗ (14.88) 0.0324 (0.06) -3.755∗∗∗ (1.02) 5.037∗∗∗ (0.61) 13.23∗∗∗ 43.30∗∗∗ 34.56∗∗∗ 312 38.78∗∗∗
SD 10.71 (8.80) 31.62+ (19.17) 19.51 (36.43) -0.0904 (0.62) -1.017 (0.94) -0.384 (1.49) 0.487 0.106 0.247 163 34.19∗∗∗
EIA FPP: PADD 3
PADD 3 -0.0824 (0.24) 37.54∗ (15.59) -60.73∗∗∗ (10.24) 0.0290 (0.04) -2.033∗ (0.80) 2.227∗∗∗ (0.41) 6.520∗ 22.16∗∗∗ 17.45∗∗∗ 312 40.49∗∗∗
AL -0.882∗∗ (0.28) 16.36∗∗ (6.21) 10.96 (12.85) 0.0000942 (0.04) -1.033∗∗∗ (0.31) -0.762 (0.53) 10.98∗∗ 0.192 6.623∗∗ 312 28.29∗∗∗
LA -0.286 (0.25) 18.37∗∗ (6.80) -12.92 (9.74) 0.0506 (0.04) -1.032∗∗ (0.34) 0.352 (0.39) 9.382∗∗ 6.905∗∗ 5.000∗∗ 312 29.50∗∗∗
MS -1.347∗∗∗ (0.24) 14.98 (9.75) -13.27 (9.59) 0.0147 (0.04) -0.795 (0.50) 0.426 (0.39) 2.570 3.818+ 1.917 312 41.04∗∗∗
NM -0.331 (0.47) 64.37∗∗ (21.58) -148.0∗∗∗ (12.80) -0.0268 (0.07) -3.678∗∗∗ (1.12) 5.493∗∗∗ (0.52) 10.19∗∗ 48.13∗∗∗ 57.76∗∗∗ 312 44.49∗∗∗
TX -0.163 (0.29) 54.33∗∗ (19.18) -84.17∗∗∗ (11.78) 0.0434 (0.05) -2.955∗∗ (0.99) 3.125∗∗∗ (0.48) 8.887∗∗ 24.00∗∗∗ 21.26∗∗∗ 312 38.26∗∗∗
EIA FPP: PADD 4
PADD 4 0.143 (0.37) 50.80∗∗ (18.35) -102.7∗∗∗ (12.86) 0.0435 (0.06) -2.887∗∗ (0.96) 3.808∗∗∗ (0.52) 8.984∗∗ 29.88∗∗∗ 26.41∗∗∗ 312 44.91∗∗∗
CO -0.465 (0.30) 61.49∗∗ (19.71) -134.8∗∗∗ (8.94) 0.0622 (0.05) -3.695∗∗∗ (1.03) 4.860∗∗∗ (0.36) 12.78∗∗∗ 53.28∗∗∗ 87.54∗∗∗ 312 38.56∗∗∗
MT -1.481∗ (0.72) 65.16∗∗ (20.84) -139.0∗∗∗ (9.65) -0.0658 (0.13) -3.953∗∗∗ (1.09) 4.984∗∗∗ (0.39) 11.74∗∗∗ 49.94∗∗∗ 76.49∗∗∗ 312 46.38∗∗∗
UT 1.270∗∗ (0.39) 54.40∗∗ (17.59) -132.0∗∗∗ (6.61) -0.00633 (0.06) -3.288∗∗∗ (0.92) 4.835∗∗∗ (0.26) 12.06∗∗∗ 72.29∗∗∗ 173.5∗∗∗ 312 35.18∗∗∗
WY 1.198∗∗ (0.43) 36.88+ (19.27) -70.35∗∗ (22.30) 0.0490 (0.06) -1.901+ (0.99) 2.766∗∗ (0.91) 3.785+ 9.579∗∗ 5.229∗∗ 312 52.83∗∗∗
EIA FPP: PADD 5
PADD 5 -5.998∗∗∗ (0.79) -0.499 (7.14) -22.08∗∗ (7.95) 0.0562 (0.09) -0.383 (0.37) 0.512 (0.33) 1.216 3.655+ 1.880 312 81.62∗∗∗
AK North Slope -6.726∗∗∗ (0.72) 8.527 (9.35) -32.37∗∗∗ (9.40) 0.0722 (0.08) -0.884+ (0.48) 0.824∗ (0.39) 3.728+ 9.504∗∗ 4.847∗∗ 312 71.81∗∗∗
CA -4.463∗∗∗ (1.04) -10.33∗ (4.96) -9.081 (7.37) -0.00364 (0.13) 0.174 (0.26) 0.0824 (0.30) 0.330 0.0492 0.178 312 81.48∗∗∗
FO CA -6.765∗∗∗ (1.13) -9.339 (8.54) 25.47∗∗ (9.72) -0.0367 (0.16) -0.131 (0.44) -1.801∗∗∗ (0.40) 0.0336 12.25∗∗∗ 10.60∗∗∗ 305 74.56∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests against normal distribution: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection. Included hurricane dummies. χ2(6) is Cumby and Huizinga (1992) statistic for autocorrelation of order 6
Standard errors in parentheses for coefficients, and p-values for test-statistics.
Significance tests against normal distribution: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 11: All crudes: price differential decomposition: OLS
Shipping Refining Stats Explanatory power
γship γapi Fref N χ
2(6) R2 R2ship R
2
ref
Mid-continent crudes
WTI Cushing -31.12∗∗∗ (3.96) -0.344 (0.26) 1.703 312 29.67∗∗∗ 0.729 0.725 0.00567
WTI Midland -37.86∗∗∗ (3.23) -0.687∗ (0.32) 4.752∗ 312 31.61∗∗∗ 0.760 0.748 0.00548
WTS -20.97∗∗∗ (4.37) -0.733+ (0.38) 3.690+ 312 28.66∗∗∗ 0.484 0.455 0.00461
Coastal crudes
LLS -9.225∗∗∗ (2.04) -0.361∗ (0.14) 6.353∗ 312 23.07∗∗∗ 0.516 0.479 0.0157
HLS -4.098+ (2.28) -0.311∗ (0.15) 4.149∗ 312 31.24∗∗∗ 0.221 0.178 0.0722
FO USGC 1.345 (2.45) -0.384 (0.25) 2.329 312 22.61∗∗∗ 0.160 0.145 0.156
EIA FPP: Stream
CA Midway-Sunset 10.91∗∗∗ (1.53) -0.348 (0.28) 1.543 267 35.41∗∗∗ 0.362 0.352 0.0354
WTI (EIA) -34.83∗∗∗ (2.98) -0.464 (0.41) 1.277 267 33.70∗∗∗ 0.742 0.738 0.0000488
WTS (EIA) -23.33∗∗∗ (4.12) -0.855+ (0.45) 3.559+ 267 33.85∗∗∗ 0.513 0.492 0.0125
EIA FPP: PADD 1
PADD 1 -39.53∗∗∗ (3.06) -0.280 (0.38) 0.546 312 37.09∗∗∗ 0.764 0.762 0.00554
PA -41.70∗∗∗ (3.92) -1.857+ (1.03) 3.263+ 188 36.68∗∗∗ 0.759 0.739 0.142
EIA FPP: PADD 2
PADD 2 -33.84∗∗∗ (3.53) -0.255 (0.24) 1.094 312 35.58∗∗∗ 0.779 0.777 0.00566
IL -22.32∗∗∗ (4.12) -0.200 (0.26) 0.585 312 31.78∗∗∗ 0.586 0.584 0.000511
KS -32.18∗∗∗ (3.83) -0.0585 (0.26) 0.0505 312 30.98∗∗∗ 0.742 0.742 0.000165
KY -18.76∗∗∗ (4.50) 0.154 (0.27) 0.316 312 30.00∗∗∗ 0.514 0.512 0.0337
NE -34.55∗∗∗ (3.17) -0.114 (0.28) 0.170 312 37.14∗∗∗ 0.759 0.759 0.0000757
ND -31.19∗∗∗ (3.67) -0.376 (0.27) 2.006 312 41.69∗∗∗ 0.727 0.722 0.00268
OH -34.54∗∗∗ (3.20) 0.0752 (0.34) 0.0476 312 34.46∗∗∗ 0.726 0.725 0.0167
OK -35.78∗∗∗ (3.85) -0.142 (0.25) 0.321 312 34.55∗∗∗ 0.765 0.765 0.00311
SD -0.672 (4.77) -0.770 (1.14) 0.457 163 30.43∗∗∗ 0.0355 0.0258 0.0350
EIA FPP: PADD 3
PADD 3 -19.09∗∗∗ (1.76) -0.508∗ (0.24) 4.578∗ 312 36.84∗∗∗ 0.573 0.554 0.00427
AL -12.82∗∗∗ (2.99) -0.138 (0.27) 0.256 312 44.27∗∗∗ 0.350 0.348 0.000377
LA -10.68∗∗∗ (1.69) -0.307+ (0.16) 3.465+ 312 30.96∗∗∗ 0.350 0.336 0.00592
MS -5.008∗∗∗ (1.07) -0.414∗ (0.21) 4.015∗ 312 46.70∗∗∗ 0.162 0.124 0.0485
NM -39.67∗∗∗ (3.01) -0.333 (0.29) 1.281 312 34.70∗∗∗ 0.765 0.762 0.0105
TX -25.38∗∗∗ (2.93) -0.556∗ (0.27) 4.197∗ 312 32.85∗∗∗ 0.636 0.621 0.0000216
EIA FPP: PADD 4
PADD 4 -31.34∗∗∗ (2.94) -0.245 (0.21) 1.366 312 33.07∗∗∗ 0.754 0.752 0.00639
CO -46.15∗∗∗ (3.06) -0.0783 (0.28) 0.0805 312 32.58∗∗∗ 0.834 0.834 0.000706
MT -45.22∗∗∗ (3.54) 0.120 (0.29) 0.169 312 37.03∗∗∗ 0.835 0.834 0.0439
UT -43.41∗∗∗ (2.73) 0.305 (0.33) 0.849 312 35.22∗∗∗ 0.837 0.836 0.0643
WY -16.80∗∗∗ (3.77) -0.414 (0.31) 1.800 312 45.00∗∗∗ 0.374 0.362 0.000668
EIA FPP: PADD 5
PADD 5 -10.25∗∗∗ (1.47) -0.147 (0.26) 0.324 312 79.66∗∗∗ 0.356 0.352 0.00148
AK North Slope -15.12∗∗∗ (1.35) -0.354 (0.22) 2.606 312 72.05∗∗∗ 0.538 0.524 0.00110
CA -5.849∗∗ (1.89) 0.172 (0.32) 0.287 312 88.07∗∗∗ 0.145 0.140 0.0267
FO CA -19.26∗∗∗ (4.27) 0.142 (0.45) 0.0984 305 81.98∗∗∗ 0.509 0.508 0.0269
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests against normal distribution: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection. Included hurricane dummies.
Fref is joint test for significance of refining variables. χ
2(6) is Cumby and Huizinga (1992) statistic for autocorrelation of order 6
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Table 12: All crudes: price differential break tests, AR(2)
Intercepts Trends Break tests Stats
α0 α1 α2 β0 β1 β2 Fβ0=β1 Fβ1=β2 Fβ0=β1=β2 N χ
2(6)
Mid-continent crudes
WTI Cushing 0.264∗ (0.10) 14.86∗∗ (5.39) -26.98∗ (11.27) 0.00377 (0.01) -0.805∗∗ (0.28) 1.052∗ (0.44) 8.120∗∗ 9.545∗∗ 5.151∗∗ 310 1.549
WTI Midland 0.239∗∗ (0.08) 16.72∗∗ (5.78) -31.04∗ (13.97) 0.00429 (0.01) -0.906∗∗ (0.30) 1.195∗ (0.55) 8.900∗∗ 9.071∗∗ 5.418∗∗ 310 2.269
WTS 0.288∗∗ (0.11) 12.59∗ (5.24) -27.31∗ (12.63) 0.00358 (0.01) -0.646∗ (0.27) 1.094∗ (0.50) 5.684∗ 8.695∗∗ 4.825∗∗ 310 3.092
Coastal crudes
LLS 0.336∗∗∗ (0.09) 3.887∗ (1.61) -8.958+ (5.05) 0.00147 (0.01) -0.188∗ (0.08) 0.331 (0.20) 5.251∗ 5.419∗ 3.768∗ 310 2.574
HLS 0.524∗∗∗ (0.11) 1.149 (1.49) -0.254 (5.41) -0.00116 (0.01) -0.0175 (0.07) -0.0168 (0.22) 0.0470 0.0000107 0.0266 310 2.013
FO USGC 0.138 (0.12) -1.897 (5.73) 4.857 (14.59) -0.000275 (0.02) 0.144 (0.29) -0.198 (0.59) 0.245 0.243 0.160 310 3.007
EIA FPP: Stream
CA Midway-Sunset -0.910∗∗ (0.32) -11.73∗ (4.99) 24.06∗∗ (9.02) 0.0204 (0.03) 0.611∗ (0.26) -0.976∗∗ (0.36) 5.258∗ 9.357∗∗ 4.680∗ 265 1.147
WTI (EIA) 0.238+ (0.14) 16.77∗∗ (5.99) -27.99∗∗ (9.84) -0.0259 (0.02) -0.941∗∗ (0.32) 1.034∗∗ (0.38) 8.289∗∗ 11.90∗∗∗ 5.992∗∗ 265 3.012
WTS (EIA) 0.0292 (0.16) 14.34∗ (5.82) -29.65∗∗ (11.27) 0.00175 (0.02) -0.762∗ (0.30) 1.154∗∗ (0.45) 6.336∗ 11.02∗∗ 5.623∗∗ 265 1.646
EIA FPP: PADD 1
PADD 1 -0.0661 (0.13) 21.25∗∗∗ (5.53) -19.91∗ (8.94) -0.00668 (0.01) -1.224∗∗∗ (0.30) 0.617+ (0.35) 16.69∗∗∗ 13.73∗∗∗ 8.939∗∗∗ 310 1.567
PA 1.456∗ (0.67) 21.75∗∗∗ (5.62) -30.08∗∗ (11.16) -0.110∗ (0.05) -1.246∗∗∗ (0.30) 1.064∗ (0.43) 14.15∗∗∗ 14.80∗∗∗ 8.461∗∗∗ 186 1.885
EIA FPP: PADD 2
PADD 2 0.0698 (0.09) 18.66∗∗ (6.35) -26.31∗ (10.45) 0.00224 (0.02) -1.045∗∗ (0.34) 0.972∗ (0.40) 9.436∗∗ 10.51∗∗ 5.551∗∗ 310 2.642
IL 0.355∗∗ (0.11) 11.83∗ (4.67) -16.49+ (9.10) -0.00329 (0.01) -0.633∗∗ (0.24) 0.641+ (0.36) 6.787∗∗ 7.699∗∗ 4.479∗ 310 1.770
KS 0.0347 (0.08) 13.52∗∗ (4.93) -24.64∗ (10.09) -0.00130 (0.01) -0.769∗∗ (0.26) 0.930∗ (0.39) 8.495∗∗ 10.08∗∗ 5.442∗∗ 310 1.006
KY 0.375∗∗ (0.12) 11.13∗ (4.52) -19.50∗ (9.39) -0.0159 (0.01) -0.601∗ (0.23) 0.778∗ (0.38) 6.293∗ 8.842∗∗ 4.865∗∗ 310 1.463
NE -0.0520 (0.10) 11.22∗ (4.48) -24.05∗ (9.51) 0.00441 (0.02) -0.662∗∗ (0.24) 0.893∗ (0.36) 7.694∗∗ 11.12∗∗∗ 5.878∗∗ 310 1.748
ND -0.00464 (0.15) 20.99∗∗ (6.80) -25.35∗ (10.81) 0.00835 (0.03) -1.172∗∗ (0.36) 0.924∗ (0.42) 10.54∗∗ 11.29∗∗∗ 6.190∗∗ 310 5.517
OH 0.00575 (0.11) 15.48∗∗ (5.00) -15.39+ (8.88) -0.0318∗ (0.01) -0.910∗∗∗ (0.27) 0.476 (0.35) 10.83∗∗ 8.766∗∗ 5.901∗∗ 310 1.787
OK -0.0686 (0.09) 15.61∗∗ (5.42) -29.45∗∗ (10.84) 0.00142 (0.01) -0.889∗∗ (0.29) 1.113∗∗ (0.42) 9.222∗∗ 11.31∗∗∗ 5.918∗∗ 310 2.747
SD 4.568 (3.35) 10.96+ (5.89) 12.80 (10.48) -0.166 (0.24) -0.424 (0.30) -0.433 (0.43) 0.438 0.000256 0.276 161 3.468
EIA FPP: PADD 3
PADD 3 -0.0168 (0.09) 13.56∗∗ (5.22) -21.46∗ (8.47) 0.00541 (0.01) -0.732∗∗ (0.27) 0.796∗ (0.33) 7.387∗∗ 11.34∗∗∗ 5.831∗∗ 310 1.586
AL -0.451∗∗ (0.14) 8.089 (4.94) 2.621 (9.28) -0.00356 (0.02) -0.515∗ (0.26) -0.271 (0.38) 3.859+ 0.286 2.141 310 1.757
LA -0.158 (0.12) 9.320∗ (4.40) -8.849 (8.44) 0.0254 (0.02) -0.525∗ (0.23) 0.268 (0.34) 5.658∗ 3.753+ 3.116∗ 310 0.346
MS -0.543∗∗∗ (0.13) 6.327 (4.11) -6.581 (6.65) 0.00403 (0.01) -0.333 (0.21) 0.222 (0.27) 2.493 2.690 1.609 310 0.417
NM -0.0521 (0.10) 16.97∗∗ (6.04) -35.27∗∗ (11.46) -0.0123 (0.01) -0.965∗∗ (0.32) 1.318∗∗ (0.44) 8.678∗∗ 13.45∗∗∗ 6.795∗∗ 310 2.862
TX -0.0292 (0.09) 14.86∗∗ (5.67) -20.73∗ (8.73) 0.00678 (0.01) -0.808∗∗ (0.29) 0.774∗ (0.34) 7.493∗∗ 9.962∗∗ 5.132∗∗ 310 2.508
EIA FPP: PADD 4
PADD 4 0.0471 (0.09) 15.81∗∗ (5.47) -26.64∗ (10.59) 0.00782 (0.02) -0.891∗∗ (0.29) 0.988∗ (0.41) 9.478∗∗ 11.59∗∗∗ 6.293∗∗ 310 2.834
CO -0.0887 (0.10) 15.93∗∗ (5.72) -34.09∗∗ (12.42) 0.00811 (0.01) -0.956∗∗ (0.32) 1.248∗∗ (0.47) 9.157∗∗ 11.37∗∗∗ 5.958∗∗ 310 2.329
MT -0.371+ (0.20) 20.92∗∗∗ (6.30) -35.62∗∗ (12.67) -0.0266 (0.03) -1.250∗∗∗ (0.34) 1.276∗∗ (0.48) 12.43∗∗∗ 14.47∗∗∗ 7.875∗∗∗ 310 3.548
UT 0.329∗ (0.13) 13.78∗∗ (5.24) -31.57∗ (12.65) -0.0108 (0.02) -0.827∗∗ (0.29) 1.176∗ (0.48) 7.892∗∗ 9.950∗∗ 5.309∗∗ 310 3.516
WY 0.336∗∗ (0.12) 13.33∗ (6.18) -15.94 (12.17) 0.0128 (0.02) -0.688∗ (0.32) 0.623 (0.49) 4.771∗ 4.933∗ 3.098∗ 310 4.006
EIA FPP: PADD 5
PADD 5 -1.781∗∗∗ (0.33) 0.350 (3.67) -8.597 (7.06) 0.00866 (0.02) -0.142 (0.19) 0.234 (0.28) 0.644 1.177 0.612 310 1.195
AK North Slope -2.165∗∗∗ (0.41) 4.242 (3.98) -12.17 (9.47) 0.0121 (0.02) -0.366+ (0.20) 0.334 (0.38) 3.355+ 2.480 1.927 310 1.519
CA -1.301∗∗∗ (0.30) -3.204 (4.21) -5.137 (6.68) -0.00551 (0.02) 0.0608 (0.22) 0.127 (0.27) 0.0940 0.0366 0.168 310 2.541
FO CA -1.531∗∗∗ (0.41) -2.017 (3.99) 0.727 (10.64) -0.0153 (0.02) -0.0367 (0.20) -0.202 (0.45) 0.0117 0.107 0.0974 303 4.021
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests against normal distribution: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection. Included 2 lags of pdc,t and hurricane dummies.
χ2(6) is Cumby and Huizinga (1992) statistic for autocorrelation of order 6
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Table 13: All crudes: price differential decomposition, AR(2)
Shipping Refining LRM: Ship LRM: Refining Stats
γship γapi γ˜ship γ˜api Fref N χ
2(6)
Mid-continent crudes
WTI Cushing -5.747∗∗ (1.98) -0.0124 (0.08) -30.02∗∗∗ (5.12) -0.0650 (0.39) 0.0256 310 1.787
WTI Midland -8.082∗∗∗ (2.08) -0.105 (0.08) -37.65∗∗∗ (5.52) -0.490 (0.32) 1.843 310 1.513
WTS -4.421∗∗ (1.38) -0.123 (0.08) -20.86∗∗∗ (5.57) -0.578+ (0.34) 2.355 310 2.837
Coastal crudes
LLS -2.648∗∗∗ (0.66) -0.0526 (0.04) -9.607∗∗∗ (2.25) -0.191 (0.14) 1.531 310 3.420
HLS -1.411∗ (0.58) -0.0618 (0.04) -4.596∗ (2.12) -0.201 (0.14) 1.933 310 4.526
FO USGC 0.468 (1.60) -0.160 (0.12) 0.979 (3.34) -0.335 (0.26) 1.660 310 2.779
EIA FPP: Stream
CA Midway-Sunset 3.199∗ (1.35) -0.0822 (0.13) 10.21∗∗∗ (2.94) -0.262 (0.38) 0.395 265 1.098
WTI (EIA) -7.947∗∗∗ (2.07) -0.0401 (0.12) -34.86∗∗∗ (4.42) -0.176 (0.49) 0.120 265 4.813
WTS (EIA) -5.560∗∗∗ (1.68) -0.159 (0.14) -23.49∗∗∗ (5.01) -0.671 (0.50) 1.370 265 2.345
EIA FPP: PADD 1
PADD 1 -6.486∗∗∗ (1.90) 0.0294 (0.08) -38.99∗∗∗ (6.27) 0.177 (0.47) 0.150 310 4.560
PA -6.523∗∗ (2.29) -0.0171 (0.33) -42.71∗∗∗ (8.70) -0.112 (2.14) 0.00267 186 2.990
EIA FPP: PADD 2
PADD 2 -8.332∗∗∗ (2.17) -0.0109 (0.07) -33.13∗∗∗ (4.29) -0.0434 (0.29) 0.0218 310 4.037
IL -3.943∗∗ (1.34) -0.00142 (0.07) -21.13∗∗∗ (4.91) -0.00762 (0.37) 0.000430 310 2.364
KS -5.650∗∗ (1.89) 0.0353 (0.07) -31.18∗∗∗ (5.14) 0.195 (0.38) 0.294 310 1.940
KY -3.106∗∗ (1.20) 0.0727 (0.07) -17.18∗∗∗ (5.02) 0.402 (0.41) 1.129 310 1.491
NE -6.404∗∗∗ (1.87) 0.0244 (0.07) -33.70∗∗∗ (5.03) 0.129 (0.37) 0.126 310 2.537
ND -10.05∗∗∗ (2.26) -0.0618 (0.10) -30.37∗∗∗ (3.93) -0.187 (0.29) 0.399 310 6.675
OH -6.279∗∗∗ (1.90) 0.0728 (0.07) -34.02∗∗∗ (5.68) 0.394 (0.42) 1.014 310 3.043
OK -6.546∗∗ (2.09) 0.0296 (0.07) -34.81∗∗∗ (5.15) 0.157 (0.40) 0.177 310 3.886
SD -0.606 (1.67) -0.00419 (0.32) -2.773 (7.70) -0.0192 (1.48) 0.000167 161 2.939
EIA FPP: PADD 3
PADD 3 -6.290∗∗∗ (1.46) -0.144+ (0.09) -19.22∗∗∗ (3.00) -0.440+ (0.25) 2.765+ 310 2.297
AL -4.757∗∗∗ (1.42) -0.0203 (0.09) -12.89∗∗∗ (3.34) -0.0549 (0.24) 0.0527 310 7.568
LA -5.096∗∗∗ (1.21) -0.132+ (0.08) -10.69∗∗∗ (2.28) -0.276+ (0.16) 2.798+ 310 1.022
MS -1.919∗ (0.89) -0.142∗ (0.07) -4.997∗ (2.37) -0.369∗ (0.17) 3.995∗ 310 1.065
NM -8.956∗∗∗ (2.38) -0.0362 (0.08) -39.54∗∗∗ (5.08) -0.160 (0.34) 0.201 310 3.389
TX -6.209∗∗∗ (1.58) -0.107 (0.08) -25.39∗∗∗ (4.00) -0.437 (0.30) 1.639 310 4.341
EIA FPP: PADD 4
PADD 4 -8.772∗∗∗ (2.19) -0.0305 (0.08) -30.55∗∗∗ (3.77) -0.106 (0.25) 0.166 310 2.661
CO -9.098∗∗ (2.83) 0.0638 (0.08) -44.97∗∗∗ (5.98) 0.315 (0.41) 0.699 310 2.040
MT -13.15∗∗∗ (3.33) 0.110 (0.09) -44.33∗∗∗ (4.76) 0.371 (0.31) 1.636 310 4.275
UT -7.956∗∗ (2.74) 0.125+ (0.07) -42.23∗∗∗ (5.78) 0.666 (0.44) 3.319+ 310 3.046
WY -4.843∗∗ (1.56) -0.109 (0.09) -16.05∗∗∗ (4.22) -0.362 (0.30) 1.384 310 3.749
EIA FPP: PADD 5
PADD 5 -3.099∗∗ (0.95) -0.0171 (0.08) -10.30∗∗∗ (2.65) -0.0570 (0.25) 0.0496 310 1.702
AK North Slope -5.098∗∗∗ (1.21) -0.0812 (0.09) -15.28∗∗∗ (2.57) -0.243 (0.25) 0.873 310 2.169
CA -1.632+ (0.95) 0.0597 (0.08) -5.950+ (3.18) 0.217 (0.29) 0.622 310 3.432
FO CA -3.272∗ (1.27) 0.0548 (0.08) -20.29∗∗∗ (5.68) 0.340 (0.49) 0.533 303 4.663
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests against normal distribution: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
OLS with HAC estimator using Bartlett kernel and Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection. Included 2 lags of pdc,t and hurricane dummies.
Fref is joint test for significance of refining variables. χ
2(6) is Cumby and Huizinga (1992) statistic for autocorrelation of order 6
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